College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized

Hafalir, IE; Hakimov, R; Kübler, D; Kurino, M

College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized

Hafalir, IE

Hakimov, R Kübler, D Kurino, M

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, 176 pp. 886 - 934
Issue Date:: 2018-07-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Hafalir, IE https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6731-2848	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Hakimov, R	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Kübler, D	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Kurino, M	en_US
dc.date.available	2020-07-01T19:11:53Z
dc.date.issued	2018-07-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, 176 pp. 886 - 934	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0022-0531	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/130078
dc.description.abstract	© 2018 Elsevier Inc. We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of “centralized college admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to one college. We show that lower ability students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. Many predictions of the theory are supported by a lab experiment designed to test the theory, yet we find a number of differences that render DCA less attractive than CCA compared to the equilibrium benchmark.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Journal of Economic Theory	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.009	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory	en_US
dc.title	College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	176	en_US
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory	en_US
utslib.for	1499 Other Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	176	en_US

Abstract:

© 2018 Elsevier Inc. We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of “centralized college admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to one college. We show that lower ability students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. Many predictions of the theory are supported by a lab experiment designed to test the theory, yet we find a number of differences that render DCA less attractive than CCA compared to the equilibrium benchmark.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/130078