Guilt averse or reciprocal? Looking at behavioral motivations in the trust game

Engler, Y; Kerschbamer, R; Page, L

Guilt averse or reciprocal? Looking at behavioral motivations in the trust game

Engler, Y Kerschbamer, R Page, L

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Publisher:: Springer Nature
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2018, 4 (1), pp. 1 - 14
Issue Date:: 2018-07

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Engler, Y	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Kerschbamer, R	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Page, L https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6020-9733	en_US
dc.date.available	2018-05-21	en_US
dc.date.issued	2018-07	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2018, 4 (1), pp. 1 - 14	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	2199-6776	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/131159
dc.description.abstract	For the trust game, recent models of belief-dependent motivations make opposite predictions regarding the correlation between back transfers and secondorder beliefs of the trustor: while reciprocity models predict a negative correlation, guilt-aversion models predict a positive one. This paper tests the hypothesis that the inconclusive results in the previous studies investigating the reaction of trustees to their beliefs are due to the fact that reciprocity and guilt aversion are behaviorally relevant for different subgroups and that their impact cancels out in the aggregate. We find little evidence in support of this hypothesis and conclude that type heterogeneity is unlikely to explain previous results.	en_US
dc.language	en	en_US
dc.publisher	Springer Nature	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Journal of the Economic Science Association	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1007/s40881-018-0051-8	en_US
dc.rights	This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Journal of the Economic Science Association. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40881-018-0051-8.	en_US
dc.title	Guilt averse or reciprocal? Looking at behavioral motivations in the trust game	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	1	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	4	en_US
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access
pubs.consider-herdc	true	en_US
pubs.issue	1	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	4	en_US

Abstract:

For the trust game, recent models of belief-dependent motivations make opposite predictions regarding the correlation between back transfers and secondorder beliefs of the trustor: while reciprocity models predict a negative correlation, guilt-aversion models predict a positive one. This paper tests the hypothesis that the inconclusive results in the previous studies investigating the reaction of trustees to their beliefs are due to the fact that reciprocity and guilt aversion are behaviorally relevant for different subgroups and that their impact cancels out in the aggregate. We find little evidence in support of this hypothesis and conclude that type heterogeneity is unlikely to explain previous results.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/131159