Are qualified and experienced outside directors willing to join fraudulent firms and if so, why?

Ghannam, S; Bugeja, M; Matolcsy, ZP; Spiropoulos, H

Are qualified and experienced outside directors willing to join fraudulent firms and if so, why?

Ghannam, S

Bugeja, M

Matolcsy, ZP

Spiropoulos, H

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Accounting Review, 2019, 94 (2), pp. 205 - 227
Issue Date:: 2019-03-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Ghannam, S https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7956-2182	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Bugeja, M https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1941-5092	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Matolcsy, ZP https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6566-5079	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Spiropoulos, H https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7748-6577	en_US
dc.date.issued	2019-03-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Accounting Review, 2019, 94 (2), pp. 205 - 227	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0001-4826	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/134893
dc.description.abstract	© 2019 American Accounting Association. All Rights Reserved. We investigate whether qualified and experienced directors are willing to join firms following the revelation of financial fraud. Specifically, we focus on directors with prior board experience and accounting and legal experts. We find that, notwithstanding the tarnished reputation of fraudulent firms and a higher workload, qualified and experienced directors join the boards of such firms. Subsequent to joining fraudulent firms, directors are rewarded with additional future board seats and benefit from higher compensation. We rule out alternative explanations and verify the robustness of the results by performing a variety of tests, including propensity score matching and difference-in-differences analysis.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Accounting Review	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.2308/accr-52195	en_US
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject.classification	Accounting	en_US
dc.title	Are qualified and experienced outside directors willing to join fraudulent firms and if so, why?	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	2	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	94	en_US
utslib.for	1501 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Accounting Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
pubs.issue	2	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	94	en_US

Abstract:

© 2019 American Accounting Association. All Rights Reserved. We investigate whether qualified and experienced directors are willing to join firms following the revelation of financial fraud. Specifically, we focus on directors with prior board experience and accounting and legal experts. We find that, notwithstanding the tarnished reputation of fraudulent firms and a higher workload, qualified and experienced directors join the boards of such firms. Subsequent to joining fraudulent firms, directors are rewarded with additional future board seats and benefit from higher compensation. We rule out alternative explanations and verify the robustness of the results by performing a variety of tests, including propensity score matching and difference-in-differences analysis.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/134893