Cognitive Networks with In-Band Full-Duplex Radios: Jamming Attacks and Countermeasures

Hanawal, MK; Nguyen, DN; Krunz, M

Cognitive Networks with In-Band Full-Duplex Radios: Jamming Attacks and Countermeasures

Hanawal, MK Nguyen, DN

Krunz, M

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking, 2020, 6 (1), pp. 296 - 309
Issue Date:: 2020-03-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Hanawal, MK	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Nguyen, DN https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2659-8648	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Krunz, M	en_US
dc.date.issued	2020-03-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking, 2020, 6 (1), pp. 296 - 309	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/135131
dc.description.abstract	© 2015 IEEE. Although in-band full-duplex (IBFD) radios promise to double the throughput of a wireless link, they are more vulnerable to jamming attacks than their out-of-band full-duplex (OBFD) counterparts. For two communicating OBFD nodes, a jammer needs to attack both the uplink and the downlink channels to completely break the communication link. In contrast, only one common channel needs to be jammed in the case of two IBFD nodes. Even worse, a jammer with self-interference suppression (SIS) capabilities (the underlying technique of IBFD radios) can learn the transmitters' activity while injecting interference, allowing it to react instantly to the transmitter's strategies. In this work, we consider a power-constrained IBFD 'reactive-sweep' jammer that sweeps through the set of channels by jamming a subset of them simultaneously. We model the interactions between the IBFD radios and the jammer as a stochastic constrained zero-sum Markov game in which nodes adopt the frequency hopping (FH) technique as their strategies to counter jamming attacks. Beside the IBFD transmission-reception (TR) mode, we introduce an additional operation mode, called transmission-detection (TD), in which an IBFD radio transmits and leverages its SIS capability to detect jammers. The aim of the TD mode is to make IBFD radios more cognitive to jamming. The nodes' optimal defense strategy that guides them when to hop and which operational mode (TD or TR) to use is then established from the equilibrium of the stochastic Markov game. We prove that this optimal policy has a threshold structure, in which IBFD nodes stay on the same channel up to a certain number of time slots before hopping. Simulation results show that our policy significantly improves the throughput of IBFD nodes under jamming attacks.	en_US
dc.relation	http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DE150101092
dc.relation.ispartof	IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1109/TCCN.2019.2933816	en_US
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
dc.title	Cognitive Networks with In-Band Full-Duplex Radios: Jamming Attacks and Countermeasures	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	1	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	6	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Electrical and Data Engineering
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Strength - GBDTC - Global Big Data Technologies
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
utslib.copyright.embargo	2021-08-30T00:00:00+1000
pubs.issue	1	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	6	en_US

Abstract:

© 2015 IEEE. Although in-band full-duplex (IBFD) radios promise to double the throughput of a wireless link, they are more vulnerable to jamming attacks than their out-of-band full-duplex (OBFD) counterparts. For two communicating OBFD nodes, a jammer needs to attack both the uplink and the downlink channels to completely break the communication link. In contrast, only one common channel needs to be jammed in the case of two IBFD nodes. Even worse, a jammer with self-interference suppression (SIS) capabilities (the underlying technique of IBFD radios) can learn the transmitters' activity while injecting interference, allowing it to react instantly to the transmitter's strategies. In this work, we consider a power-constrained IBFD 'reactive-sweep' jammer that sweeps through the set of channels by jamming a subset of them simultaneously. We model the interactions between the IBFD radios and the jammer as a stochastic constrained zero-sum Markov game in which nodes adopt the frequency hopping (FH) technique as their strategies to counter jamming attacks. Beside the IBFD transmission-reception (TR) mode, we introduce an additional operation mode, called transmission-detection (TD), in which an IBFD radio transmits and leverages its SIS capability to detect jammers. The aim of the TD mode is to make IBFD radios more cognitive to jamming. The nodes' optimal defense strategy that guides them when to hop and which operational mode (TD or TR) to use is then established from the equilibrium of the stochastic Markov game. We prove that this optimal policy has a threshold structure, in which IBFD nodes stay on the same channel up to a certain number of time slots before hopping. Simulation results show that our policy significantly improves the throughput of IBFD nodes under jamming attacks.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/135131