Non-exclusive financial advice

Piccolo, S; Puopolo, GW; Vasconcelos, L

Non-exclusive financial advice

Piccolo, S Puopolo, GW Vasconcelos, L

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Review of Finance, 2016, 20 (6), pp. 2079 - 2123
Issue Date:: 2016-10-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Piccolo, S	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Puopolo, GW	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Vasconcelos, L https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2952-5674	en_US
dc.date.issued	2016-10-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Review of Finance, 2016, 20 (6), pp. 2079 - 2123	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1572-3097	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/135746
dc.description.abstract	© 2016 The Authors 2015. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the European Finance Association. We propose a simple model of non-exclusive financial advice in which two households rely on a self-interested (common) expert to make their investment choices. There is only one source of risk, and the expert is privately informed about the risky asset's volatility. When monetary transfers are unenforceable, we show that investors may delegate their investment decisions to the expert. When doing so, however, they impose restrictions on her choices which crucially depend on whether the expert perceives investors' asset allocations as complements or as substitutes. Finally, we analyze the implications of non-exclusivity in financial advice on investment behavior and welfare, and highlight a set of novel testable implications.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Review of Finance	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1093/rof/rfv055	en_US
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject.classification	Finance	en_US
dc.title	Non-exclusive financial advice	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	6	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	20	en_US
utslib.for	1501 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability	en_US
utslib.for	1502 Banking, Finance and Investment	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
pubs.issue	6	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	20	en_US

Abstract:

© 2016 The Authors 2015. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the European Finance Association. We propose a simple model of non-exclusive financial advice in which two households rely on a self-interested (common) expert to make their investment choices. There is only one source of risk, and the expert is privately informed about the risky asset's volatility. When monetary transfers are unenforceable, we show that investors may delegate their investment decisions to the expert. When doing so, however, they impose restrictions on her choices which crucially depend on whether the expert perceives investors' asset allocations as complements or as substitutes. Finally, we analyze the implications of non-exclusivity in financial advice on investment behavior and welfare, and highlight a set of novel testable implications.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/135746