Discriminatory Auctions with Resale

Springer Verlag
Publication Type:
Journal Article
Economic Theory Bulletin, 2019, 7 (2), pp. 173 - 189
Issue Date:
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We consider multi-unit discriminatory auctions where ex ante symmetric bidders have single-unit demands and resale is allowed after the bidding stage. When bidders use the optimal auction to sell items in the resale stage, the equilibrium in the auction without resale is no longer an equilibrium in an auction with resale. We find a symmetric and monotone equilibrium when there are two units for sale, and, interestingly, we show that there may not be a symmetric and monotone equilibrium if there are more than two units.
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