Discriminatory Auctions with Resale

Hafalir, I; Kurnaz, M

Discriminatory Auctions with Resale

Hafalir, I

Kurnaz, M

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Publisher:: Springer Verlag
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Economic Theory Bulletin, 2019, 7 (2), pp. 173 - 189
Issue Date:: 2019-12-02

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Hafalir, I https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6731-2848	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Kurnaz, M	en_US
dc.date.available	2018-06-25	en_US
dc.date.issued	2019-12-02	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Economic Theory Bulletin, 2019, 7 (2), pp. 173 - 189	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	2196-1085	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/138624
dc.description.abstract	We consider multi-unit discriminatory auctions where ex ante symmetric bidders have single-unit demands and resale is allowed after the bidding stage. When bidders use the optimal auction to sell items in the resale stage, the equilibrium in the auction without resale is no longer an equilibrium in an auction with resale. We find a symmetric and monotone equilibrium when there are two units for sale, and, interestingly, we show that there may not be a symmetric and monotone equilibrium if there are more than two units.	en_US
dc.publisher	Springer Verlag	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Economic Theory Bulletin	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1007/s40505-018-0152-9	en_US
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.title	Discriminatory Auctions with Resale	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	2	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	7	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
pubs.consider-herdc	true	en_US
pubs.issue	2	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	7	en_US

Abstract:

We consider multi-unit discriminatory auctions where ex ante symmetric bidders have single-unit demands and resale is allowed after the bidding stage. When bidders use the optimal auction to sell items in the resale stage, the equilibrium in the auction without resale is no longer an equilibrium in an auction with resale. We find a symmetric and monotone equilibrium when there are two units for sale, and, interestingly, we show that there may not be a symmetric and monotone equilibrium if there are more than two units.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/138624