Community Asset Valuations by Non-profit Government Entities

Czernkowski, R; Lim, S

Community Asset Valuations by Non-profit Government Entities

Czernkowski, R

Lim, S

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Australian Accounting Review, 2019, 29 (3), pp. 556 - 579
Issue Date:: 2019-09-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Czernkowski, R https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8381-8304	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Lim, S	en_US
dc.date.issued	2019-09-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Australian Accounting Review, 2019, 29 (3), pp. 556 - 579	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1035-6908	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/138842
dc.description.abstract	© 2018 CPA Australia This paper examines an implication of applying International Financial Reporting Standards to the government sector in Australia. We posit both a self-interest and a transparency motivation for local governments effecting revaluations of both infrastructure assets and community land. The self-interest motivation was expected to manifest as a relationship between the amount of revaluation and CEO (or management team) remuneration. The transparency motivation was expected to result in a relationship between revaluation and the extent of spending on these assets, measured as both the quantum of materials and contracts expense, and as the quantum of contracts awarded by the entity above the disclosure threshold. We also speculated that revaluations may be used to signal to state governments a need for additional funds through capital and/or operating grants. At conventional levels of significance, we find no support for these relationships, suggesting that agency motivations at the local government level are either more subtle or non-existent. As local government authorities in our study follow a reporting framework and standardised accounting procedures prescribed by the state government (in compliance with applicable AASB/IFRS standards), financial and public accountabilities are also likely to be a driver for the valuation of local infrastructure assets at fair value, and this is not likely to be undermined by the opportunistic incentives we have considered.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Australian Accounting Review	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1111/auar.12239	en_US
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
dc.title	Community Asset Valuations by Non-profit Government Entities	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	3	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	29	en_US
utslib.for	1501 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability	en_US
utslib.for	1499 Other Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Accounting Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
utslib.copyright.embargo	2021-09-01T00:00:00+1000
pubs.issue	3	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	29	en_US

Abstract:

© 2018 CPA Australia This paper examines an implication of applying International Financial Reporting Standards to the government sector in Australia. We posit both a self-interest and a transparency motivation for local governments effecting revaluations of both infrastructure assets and community land. The self-interest motivation was expected to manifest as a relationship between the amount of revaluation and CEO (or management team) remuneration. The transparency motivation was expected to result in a relationship between revaluation and the extent of spending on these assets, measured as both the quantum of materials and contracts expense, and as the quantum of contracts awarded by the entity above the disclosure threshold. We also speculated that revaluations may be used to signal to state governments a need for additional funds through capital and/or operating grants. At conventional levels of significance, we find no support for these relationships, suggesting that agency motivations at the local government level are either more subtle or non-existent. As local government authorities in our study follow a reporting framework and standardised accounting procedures prescribed by the state government (in compliance with applicable AASB/IFRS standards), financial and public accountabilities are also likely to be a driver for the valuation of local infrastructure assets at fair value, and this is not likely to be undermined by the opportunistic incentives we have considered.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/138842