Incentives for Effort Provision in Groups

Levy, Jonathan

Incentives for Effort Provision in Groups

Levy, Jonathan

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Publication Type:: Thesis
Issue Date:: 2020

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Levy, Jonathan
dc.date.accessioned	2020-05-25T04:53:16Z
dc.date.available	2020-05-25T04:53:16Z
dc.date.issued	2020
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/140919
dc.description	University of Technology Sydney. Faculty of Business.	en_AU
dc.description.abstract	This thesis consists of three independent essays, unified by the common theme of incentives for effort provision in groups. In Chapter 2 we develop a multi-stage contest design where heterogeneous agents face the prospect of promotion and the threat of demotion from one stage to the next. We illustrate theoretically that if agents are homogeneous in ability, the principal is better off pooling agents in one division. However, if there are ability differences, the principal is better off assigning agents to separate divisions based on ability level, while allowing for agents to be promoted and demoted after each stage of play. The experimental results support the use of promotion and demotion in multi-stage contests when abilities are heterogeneous. In contrast with the theoretical predictions, we did not find significant differences in total effort between the pooled contest and the contest with promotion and demotion when abilities were homogeneous. Chapter 3 provides a comparison between a two-strike exclusion policy and a zero-tolerance exclusion policy as a means for fostering cooperation in groups. The results from our experiment suggest that group members tend to cooperate more after receiving a strike. However, requiring group members to issue strikes to one another prior to exclusion seemed to be less effective than allowing for exclusion without prior receipt of strikes. In Chapter 4 we determine whether the efficacy of mutual monitoring in fostering cooperation is dependent on the degree of approval motivation within teams. Approval motivation is defined as the desire to produce positive perceptions in others and the incentive to acquire the approval of others as well as the desire to avoid disapproval, Martin (1984). The hypotheses developed in the theoretical section provide support for the notion that individuals will be more responsive to mutual monitoring if they possess a higher degree of approval motivation. However, the results generated from the experiment suggest that the efficacy of mutual monitoring in fostering cooperation is negatively correlated with the degree of approval motivation within teams.	en_AU
dc.format	Thesis (PhD)
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.relation	https://opus.lib.uts.edu.au/bitstream/10453/140919/2/02whole.pdf
dc.rights	au.edu.uts.lib/ppc
dc.rights	The author owns the copyright in this thesis including all reproduction and reuse rights for the work. The work may not be altered without the permission of the copyright owner. Attribution is essential when quoting or paraphrasing from this thesis.
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.title	Incentives for Effort Provision in Groups	en_AU
dc.type	Thesis
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*

Abstract:

This thesis consists of three independent essays, unified by the common theme of incentives for effort provision in groups. In Chapter 2 we develop a multi-stage contest design where heterogeneous agents face the prospect of promotion and the threat of demotion from one stage to the next. We illustrate theoretically that if agents are homogeneous in ability, the principal is better off pooling agents in one division. However, if there are ability differences, the principal is better off assigning agents to separate divisions based on ability level, while allowing for agents to be promoted and demoted after each stage of play. The experimental results support the use of promotion and demotion in multi-stage contests when abilities are heterogeneous. In contrast with the theoretical predictions, we did not find significant differences in total effort between the pooled contest and the contest with promotion and demotion when abilities were homogeneous. Chapter 3 provides a comparison between a two-strike exclusion policy and a zero-tolerance exclusion policy as a means for fostering cooperation in groups. The results from our experiment suggest that group members tend to cooperate more after receiving a strike. However, requiring group members to issue strikes to one another prior to exclusion seemed to be less effective than allowing for exclusion without prior receipt of strikes. In Chapter 4 we determine whether the efficacy of mutual monitoring in fostering cooperation is dependent on the degree of approval motivation within teams. Approval motivation is defined as the desire to produce positive perceptions in others and the incentive to acquire the approval of others as well as the desire to avoid disapproval, Martin (1984). The hypotheses developed in the theoretical section provide support for the notion that individuals will be more responsive to mutual monitoring if they possess a higher degree of approval motivation. However, the results generated from the experiment suggest that the efficacy of mutual monitoring in fostering cooperation is negatively correlated with the degree of approval motivation within teams.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/140919