Dissolving a partnership securely

Van Essen, M; Wooders, J

Dissolving a partnership securely

Van Essen, M Wooders, J

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Publisher:: Springer (part of Springer Nature)
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Economic Theory, 2019, 69, (2), pp. 415-434
Issue Date:: 2019-01-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Van Essen, M
dc.contributor.author	Wooders, J https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4206-7137
dc.date.accessioned	2020-10-02T04:28:01Z
dc.date.available	2020-10-02T04:28:01Z
dc.date.issued	2019-01-01
dc.identifier.citation	Economic Theory, 2019, 69, (2), pp. 415-434
dc.identifier.issn	0938-2259
dc.identifier.issn	1432-0479
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/143003
dc.description.abstract	© 2019, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature. We characterize security strategies and payoffs for three mechanisms for dissolving partnerships: the Texas Shoot-Out, the K+ 1 auction, and the compensation auction. A security strategy maximizes a participant’s minimum payoff, and represents a natural starting point for analysis when a participant is either uncertain of the environment or uncertain of whether his rivals will play equilibrium. For the compensation auction, a dynamic dissolution mechanism, we introduce the notion of a perfect security strategy. Such a strategy maximizes a participant’s minimum payoff along every path of play. We show that while a player has many security strategies in the compensation auction, he has a unique perfect security strategy.
dc.language	English
dc.publisher	Springer (part of Springer Nature)
dc.relation	http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP140103566
dc.relation	http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/
dc.relation.ispartof	Economic Theory
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1007/s00199-019-01177-9
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject	1401 Economic Theory, 1402 Applied Economics, 1403 Econometrics
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory
dc.title	Dissolving a partnership securely
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	69
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics
utslib.for	1403 Econometrics
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
pubs.consider-herdc	false
dc.date.updated	2020-10-02T04:27:40Z
pubs.issue	2
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	69
utslib.citation.issue	2

Abstract:

© 2019, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature. We characterize security strategies and payoffs for three mechanisms for dissolving partnerships: the Texas Shoot-Out, the K+ 1 auction, and the compensation auction. A security strategy maximizes a participant’s minimum payoff, and represents a natural starting point for analysis when a participant is either uncertain of the environment or uncertain of whether his rivals will play equilibrium. For the compensation auction, a dynamic dissolution mechanism, we introduce the notion of a perfect security strategy. Such a strategy maximizes a participant’s minimum payoff along every path of play. We show that while a player has many security strategies in the compensation auction, he has a unique perfect security strategy.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/143003