Corporate Watchdogs

Navone, M; To, T

Corporate Watchdogs

Navone, M

To, T

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Publisher:: Wiley
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Financial Management, 2020
Issue Date:: 2020

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Navone, M https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6273-1808
dc.contributor.author	To, T
dc.date.accessioned	2020-11-18T01:57:45Z
dc.date.available	2020-11-18T01:57:45Z
dc.date.issued	2020
dc.identifier.citation	Financial Management, 2020
dc.identifier.issn	1755-053X
dc.identifier.issn	1755-053X
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/144111
dc.description.abstract	© 2019 Financial Management Association International We investigate the role of financial analysts as corporate watchdogs. We show that firms that are subject to intense analyst monitoring are more likely to be investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission or to be the subject of a securities class action. Using cross-sectional variations in managerial entrenchment, we find that this effect is not a reflection of the “dark side of analyst coverage,” analysts pushing executives to misbehave to exceed short-term expectations. Our findings are robust to different identification strategies addressing the endogeneity of analyst coverage decisions.
dc.language	English
dc.publisher	Wiley
dc.relation.ispartof	Financial Management
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1111/fima.12291
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject	1502 Banking, Finance and Investment
dc.subject.classification	Finance
dc.title	Corporate Watchdogs
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.for	1502 Banking, Finance and Investment
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Finance Discipline
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Accounting Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
pubs.consider-herdc	false
dc.date.updated	2020-11-18T01:57:40Z
pubs.publication-status	Accepted

Abstract:

© 2019 Financial Management Association International We investigate the role of financial analysts as corporate watchdogs. We show that firms that are subject to intense analyst monitoring are more likely to be investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission or to be the subject of a securities class action. Using cross-sectional variations in managerial entrenchment, we find that this effect is not a reflection of the “dark side of analyst coverage,” analysts pushing executives to misbehave to exceed short-term expectations. Our findings are robust to different identification strategies addressing the endogeneity of analyst coverage decisions.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/144111