Redesigning the market for volunteers: A donor registry

Heger, SA; Slonim, R; Garbarino, E; Wang, C; Waller, D

Redesigning the market for volunteers: A donor registry

Heger, SA Slonim, R Garbarino, E Wang, C Waller, D

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Publisher:: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Management Science, 2020, 66, (8), pp. 3528-3541
Issue Date:: 2020-08-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Heger, SA
dc.contributor.author	Slonim, R
dc.contributor.author	Garbarino, E
dc.contributor.author	Wang, C
dc.contributor.author	Waller, D https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4140-6923
dc.date.accessioned	2021-03-29T19:51:24Z
dc.date.available	2021-03-29T19:51:24Z
dc.date.issued	2020-08-01
dc.identifier.citation	Management Science, 2020, 66, (8), pp. 3528-3541
dc.identifier.issn	0025-1909
dc.identifier.issn	1526-5501
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/147630
dc.description.abstract	© 2020 INFORMS This paper addresses volunteer labor markets where the lack of price signals, nonpecuniary motivations to supply labor, and limited fungibility of supply lead to market failure. To address the causes of the market failure, we conduct a field experiment with volunteer whole blood donors where we introduce a market-clearing mechanism (henceforth: the Registry). Our intention-to-treat estimates suggest that subjects invited to the Registry, regardless of joining, are 66% more responsive to critical shortage appeals than control subjects. While the Registry increases supply during a critical shortage episode, it does not increase supply when there is no shortage; thus, the Registry significantly improves coordination between volunteer donors and collection centers, thereby improving market outcomes. We find evidence that the Registry's effectiveness stems from crowding-in volunteers with purely altruistic motives and volunteers with a preference for commitment.
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
dc.relation.ispartof	Management Science
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1287/mnsc.2019.3371
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject	08 Information and Computing Sciences, 15 Commerce, Management, Tourism and Services
dc.subject.classification	Operations Research
dc.title	Redesigning the market for volunteers: A donor registry
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	66
utslib.for	1117 Public Health and Health Services
utslib.for	150302 Business Information Systems
utslib.for	08 Information and Computing Sciences
utslib.for	15 Commerce, Management, Tourism and Services
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Health
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
dc.date.updated	2021-03-29T19:51:23Z
pubs.issue	8
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	66
utslib.citation.issue	8

Abstract:

© 2020 INFORMS This paper addresses volunteer labor markets where the lack of price signals, nonpecuniary motivations to supply labor, and limited fungibility of supply lead to market failure. To address the causes of the market failure, we conduct a field experiment with volunteer whole blood donors where we introduce a market-clearing mechanism (henceforth: the Registry). Our intention-to-treat estimates suggest that subjects invited to the Registry, regardless of joining, are 66% more responsive to critical shortage appeals than control subjects. While the Registry increases supply during a critical shortage episode, it does not increase supply when there is no shortage; thus, the Registry significantly improves coordination between volunteer donors and collection centers, thereby improving market outcomes. We find evidence that the Registry's effectiveness stems from crowding-in volunteers with purely altruistic motives and volunteers with a preference for commitment.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/147630