Strategically delusional
- Publisher:
- Springer Link
- Publication Type:
- Journal Article
- Citation:
- Experimental Economics, 2020, 23, (3), pp. 604-631
- Issue Date:
- 2020-07-01
Closed Access
| Filename | Description | Size | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Soldà2020_Article_StrategicallyDelusional.pdf | Published version | 2.88 MB |
Copyright Clearance Process
- Recently Added
- In Progress
- Closed Access
This item is closed access and not available.
We aim to test the hypothesis that overconfidence arises as a strategy to influence others in social interactions. To address this question, we design an experiment in which participants are incentivized either to form accurate beliefs about their performance at a test, or to convince a group of other participants that they performed well. We also vary participants’ ability to gather information about their performance. Our results show that participants are more likely to (1) overestimate their performance when they anticipate that they will try to persuade others and (2) bias their information search in a manner conducive to receiving more positive feedback, when given the chance to do so. In addition, we also find suggestive evidence that this increase in confidence has a positive effect on participants’ persuasiveness.
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: