Managing a conflict: optimal alternative dispute resolution

Balzer, B; Schneider, J

Managing a conflict: optimal alternative dispute resolution

Balzer, B

Schneider, J

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Publisher:: Wiley
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: RAND Journal of Economics, 2021, 52, (2), pp. 415-445
Issue Date:: 2021-06-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Balzer, B https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9508-8487
dc.contributor.author	Schneider, J
dc.date.accessioned	2021-12-21T01:22:14Z
dc.date.available	2021-12-21T01:22:14Z
dc.date.issued	2021-06-01
dc.identifier.citation	RAND Journal of Economics, 2021, 52, (2), pp. 415-445
dc.identifier.issn	0741-6261
dc.identifier.issn	1756-2171
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/152435
dc.description.abstract	We study optimal methods for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), a technique to achieve settlement and avoid costly adversarial hearings. Participation is voluntary. Disputants are privately informed about their marginal cost of evidence provision. If ADR fails to engender settlement, the disputants can use the information obtained during ADR to determine what evidence to provide in an adversarial hearing. Optimal ADR induces an asymmetric information structure but makes the learning report-independent. It is ex ante fair and decreases the disputants' expenditures, even if they fail to settle. We highlight the importance of real-world mediation techniques, such as caucusing, for implementing optimal ADR.
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Wiley
dc.relation.ispartof	RAND Journal of Economics
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1111/1756-2171.12374
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights	© 2021 The Authors. The RAND Journal of Economics published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of The RANDCorporation This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial Li-cense, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited andis not used for commercial purposes.
dc.subject	14 Economics
dc.subject.classification	Economics
dc.title	Managing a conflict: optimal alternative dispute resolution
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	52
utslib.for	14 Economics
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
dc.date.updated	2021-12-21T01:22:13Z
pubs.issue	2
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	52
utslib.citation.issue	2

Abstract:

We study optimal methods for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), a technique to achieve settlement and avoid costly adversarial hearings. Participation is voluntary. Disputants are privately informed about their marginal cost of evidence provision. If ADR fails to engender settlement, the disputants can use the information obtained during ADR to determine what evidence to provide in an adversarial hearing. Optimal ADR induces an asymmetric information structure but makes the learning report-independent. It is ex ante fair and decreases the disputants' expenditures, even if they fail to settle. We highlight the importance of real-world mediation techniques, such as caucusing, for implementing optimal ADR.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/152435