A Hierarchical Game Model for OFDM Integrated Radar and Communication Systems

Nguyen, HT; Hoang, DT; Luong, NC; Niyato, D; Kim, DI

A Hierarchical Game Model for OFDM Integrated Radar and Communication Systems

Nguyen, HT Hoang, DT Luong, NC Niyato, D Kim, DI

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Publisher:: IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, 2021, 70, (5), pp. 5077-5082
Issue Date:: 2021-05-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Nguyen, HT
dc.contributor.author	Hoang, DT
dc.contributor.author	Luong, NC
dc.contributor.author	Niyato, D
dc.contributor.author	Kim, DI
dc.date.accessioned	2022-02-22T22:34:10Z
dc.date.available	2022-02-22T22:34:10Z
dc.date.issued	2021-05-01
dc.identifier.citation	IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, 2021, 70, (5), pp. 5077-5082
dc.identifier.issn	0018-9545
dc.identifier.issn	1939-9359
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/154786
dc.description.abstract	This paper studies the spectrum allocation problem between spectrum service providers (SSPs) and terminals equipped with orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) integrated radar and communication (IRC) systems. In particular, IRC-equipped terminals such as autonomous vehicles need to buy spectrum for their radar functions, e.g., sensing and detecting distant vehicles, and communication functions, e.g., transmitting sensing data to road-side units. The terminals determine their spectrum demands from the SSPs subject to their IRC performance requirements, while the SSPs compete with each other on the service prices to attract terminals. Taking into account the complicated interactions, a hierarchical Stackelberg game is proposed to reconcile the spectrum demand and service price, where the SSPs are the leaders and the terminals are the followers. Due to the spectrum constraints of the SSPs, we model the lower-layer subgame among the terminals as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem. An iterative searching algorithm is then developed that guarantees the convergence to the Stackelberg equilibrium. Numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed scheme in terms of social welfare compared to baseline schemes.
dc.language	English
dc.publisher	IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
dc.relation.ispartof	IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1109/TVT.2021.3069431
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
dc.subject	08 Information and Computing Sciences, 09 Engineering, 10 Technology
dc.subject.classification	Automobile Design & Engineering
dc.title	A Hierarchical Game Model for OFDM Integrated Radar and Communication Systems
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	70
utslib.for	08 Information and Computing Sciences
utslib.for	09 Engineering
utslib.for	10 Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Strength - GBDTC - Global Big Data Technologies
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Electrical and Data Engineering
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
utslib.copyright.embargo	2023-05-31T00:00:00+1000Z
dc.date.updated	2022-02-22T22:34:08Z
pubs.issue	5
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	70
utslib.citation.issue	5

Abstract:

This paper studies the spectrum allocation problem between spectrum service providers (SSPs) and terminals equipped with orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) integrated radar and communication (IRC) systems. In particular, IRC-equipped terminals such as autonomous vehicles need to buy spectrum for their radar functions, e.g., sensing and detecting distant vehicles, and communication functions, e.g., transmitting sensing data to road-side units. The terminals determine their spectrum demands from the SSPs subject to their IRC performance requirements, while the SSPs compete with each other on the service prices to attract terminals. Taking into account the complicated interactions, a hierarchical Stackelberg game is proposed to reconcile the spectrum demand and service price, where the SSPs are the leaders and the terminals are the followers. Due to the spectrum constraints of the SSPs, we model the lower-layer subgame among the terminals as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem. An iterative searching algorithm is then developed that guarantees the convergence to the Stackelberg equilibrium. Numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed scheme in terms of social welfare compared to baseline schemes.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/154786