Bidders' choice auctions: Raising revenues through the right to choose

Goeree, J; Plott, C; Wooders, J

Bidders' choice auctions: Raising revenues through the right to choose

Goeree, J

Plott, C Wooders, J

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Publisher:: Wiley
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Journal of the European Economic Association, 2004, 2, (2-3), pp. 504-515
Issue Date:: 2004-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Goeree, J https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9876-3425
dc.contributor.author	Plott, C
dc.contributor.author	Wooders, J https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4206-7137
dc.date.accessioned	2022-03-31T11:34:15Z
dc.date.available	2022-03-31T11:34:15Z
dc.date.issued	2004-01
dc.identifier.citation	Journal of the European Economic Association, 2004, 2, (2-3), pp. 504-515
dc.identifier.issn	1542-4774
dc.identifier.issn	1542-4774
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/155798
dc.description.abstract	Sales of multiple real-estate properties are often conducted via a sequence of ascending auctions, giving the winner at each stage the right to choose one of the available lots. We show that when bidders are risk averse, such bidders' choice auctions raise more revenues than standard simultaneous or sequential ascending auctions. We also report the results of laboratory experiments to investigate the effectiveness of bidders' choice auctions vis-a-vis the simultaneous ascending auction. The revenue-superiority of the bidders' choice auction is corroborated by the experimental data. Finally, we compare observed bidding behavior in the experiments with theoretically predicted bids to estimate a common risk aversion parameter from the data. © 2004 by the European Economic Association.
dc.language	English
dc.publisher	Wiley
dc.relation.ispartof	Journal of the European Economic Association
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1162/154247604323068186
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject	14 Economics
dc.subject.classification	Economics
dc.title	Bidders' choice auctions: Raising revenues through the right to choose
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	2
utslib.for	14 Economics
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
pubs.consider-herdc	false
dc.date.updated	2022-03-31T11:34:14Z
pubs.issue	2-3
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	2
utslib.citation.issue	2-3

Abstract:

Sales of multiple real-estate properties are often conducted via a sequence of ascending auctions, giving the winner at each stage the right to choose one of the available lots. We show that when bidders are risk averse, such bidders' choice auctions raise more revenues than standard simultaneous or sequential ascending auctions. We also report the results of laboratory experiments to investigate the effectiveness of bidders' choice auctions vis-a-vis the simultaneous ascending auction. The revenue-superiority of the bidders' choice auction is corroborated by the experimental data. Finally, we compare observed bidding behavior in the experiments with theoretically predicted bids to estimate a common risk aversion parameter from the data. © 2004 by the European Economic Association.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/155798