STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF TULLOCK CONTESTS WITH AN APPLICATION TO U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTIONS

Huang, Y; He, M

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF TULLOCK CONTESTS WITH AN APPLICATION TO U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTIONS

Huang, Y He, M

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Publisher:: Wiley
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: International Economic Review, 2021, 62, (3), pp. 1011-1054
Issue Date:: 2021-08-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Huang, Y
dc.contributor.author	He, M https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2663-9526
dc.date.accessioned	2022-04-27T20:21:27Z
dc.date.available	2022-04-27T20:21:27Z
dc.date.issued	2021-08-01
dc.identifier.citation	International Economic Review, 2021, 62, (3), pp. 1011-1054
dc.identifier.issn	0020-6598
dc.identifier.issn	1468-2354
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/156682
dc.description.abstract	We study the econometrics of an asymmetric Tullock contest model with incomplete information. Identification results are established for parameters in the asymmetric contest success function and for the quantile functions of players' private costs. We propose the corresponding estimators, derive the asymptotic properties, and demonstrate their good finite sample performances by simulation. We also propose an easy-to-implement parametric estimation method that can incorporate contest-specific covariates. Our method is used to study U.S. House of Representatives elections. We quantify the incumbency advantages and conduct policy experiments to evaluate how imposing a term limit or launching campaign finance reforms affects incumbency advantage.
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Wiley
dc.relation.ispartof	International Economic Review
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1111/iere.12502
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject	14 Economics
dc.subject.classification	Economics
dc.title	STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF TULLOCK CONTESTS WITH AN APPLICATION TO U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTIONS
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	62
utslib.for	14 Economics
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
dc.date.updated	2022-04-27T20:21:25Z
pubs.issue	3
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	62
utslib.citation.issue	3

Abstract:

We study the econometrics of an asymmetric Tullock contest model with incomplete information. Identification results are established for parameters in the asymmetric contest success function and for the quantile functions of players' private costs. We propose the corresponding estimators, derive the asymptotic properties, and demonstrate their good finite sample performances by simulation. We also propose an easy-to-implement parametric estimation method that can incorporate contest-specific covariates. Our method is used to study U.S. House of Representatives elections. We quantify the incumbency advantages and conduct policy experiments to evaluate how imposing a term limit or launching campaign finance reforms affects incumbency advantage.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/156682