One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles, and Research Joint Ventures

Amir, R; Wooders, J

One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles, and Research Joint Ventures

Amir, R Wooders, J

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Games and Economic Behavior, 2000, 31 (1), pp. 1 - 25
Issue Date:: 2000-04-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Amir, R	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Wooders, J https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4206-7137	en_US
dc.date.issued	2000-04-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Games and Economic Behavior, 2000, 31 (1), pp. 1 - 25	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0899-8256	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/15696
dc.description.abstract	We consider a two-period duopoly characterized by a one-way spillover structure in process R&D and a very broad specification of product market competition. We show that a priori identical firms always engage in different levels of R&D, at equilibrium, thus giving rise to an innovator/imitator configuration and ending up with different sizes. We also provide a general analysis of the social benefits of, and firms' incentive for, forming research joint ventures. Another contribution is methodological, illustrating how submodularity (R&D decisions are strategic substitutes) can be exploited to provide a general analysis of a R&D game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, L13, O31. © 2000 Academic Press.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Games and Economic Behavior	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1006/game.1999.0734	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory	en_US
dc.title	One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles, and Research Joint Ventures	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	1	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	31	en_US
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.issue	1	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	31	en_US

Abstract:

We consider a two-period duopoly characterized by a one-way spillover structure in process R&D and a very broad specification of product market competition. We show that a priori identical firms always engage in different levels of R&D, at equilibrium, thus giving rise to an innovator/imitator configuration and ending up with different sizes. We also provide a general analysis of the social benefits of, and firms' incentive for, forming research joint ventures. Another contribution is methodological, illustrating how submodularity (R&D decisions are strategic substitutes) can be exploited to provide a general analysis of a R&D game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, L13, O31. © 2000 Academic Press.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/15696