Matching and bargaining models of markets: Approximating small markets by large markets

Wooders, J

Matching and bargaining models of markets: Approximating small markets by large markets

Wooders, J

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Economic Theory, 1998, 11 (1), pp. 215 - 224
Issue Date:: 1998-01-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Wooders, J https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4206-7137	en_US
dc.date.issued	1998-01-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Economic Theory, 1998, 11 (1), pp. 215 - 224	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0938-2259	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/15725
dc.description.abstract	We show that the equilibrium of a matching and bargaining model of a market in which there is a finite number of agents at each date need not be near the equilibrium of a market with a continuum of agents, although matching probabilities are the same in both markets. Holding the matching process fixed, as the finite market becomes large its equilibrium approaches the equilibrium of its continuum limit.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Economic Theory	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1007/s001990050186	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory	en_US
dc.title	Matching and bargaining models of markets: Approximating small markets by large markets	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	1	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	11	en_US
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
utslib.for	1403 Econometrics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.issue	1	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	11	en_US

Abstract:

We show that the equilibrium of a matching and bargaining model of a market in which there is a finite number of agents at each date need not be near the equilibrium of a market with a continuum of agents, although matching probabilities are the same in both markets. Holding the matching process fixed, as the finite market becomes large its equilibrium approaches the equilibrium of its continuum limit.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/15725