Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates

Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science
Publication Type:
Journal Article
Games And Economic Behavior, 2003, 42 (2), pp. 183 - 207
Issue Date:
Full metadata record
Files in This Item:
Filename Description SizeFormat
2010005896OK.pdf224.48 kBAdobe PDF
This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post firm symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the structure of profit-maximizing R&D cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal spillover, levels. We establish the firms would essentially always prefer extremal spillovers, and within the context of a standard specification, derive conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover.
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: