Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates
- Publication Type:
- Journal Article
- Citation:
- Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, 42 (2), pp. 183 - 207
- Issue Date:
- 2003-01-01
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This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post firm symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the structure of profit-maximizing R&D cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal spillover, levels. We establish the firms would essentially always prefer extremal spillovers, and within the context of a standard specification, derive conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover. © 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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