An experimental study of communication and coordination in noncooperative games

Moreno, D; Wooders, J

An experimental study of communication and coordination in noncooperative games

Moreno, D Wooders, J

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Games and Economic Behavior, 1998, 24 (1-2), pp. 47 - 76
Issue Date:: 1998-01-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Moreno, D	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Wooders, J https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4206-7137	en_US
dc.date.issued	1998-01-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Games and Economic Behavior, 1998, 24 (1-2), pp. 47 - 76	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0899-8256	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/15753
dc.description.abstract	This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test the usefulness of alternative solution concepts to explain players' behavior in noncooperative games with preplay communication. In the experiment subjects communicate by plain conversation prior to playing a simple game. In this setting, we find that the presumption of individualistic and independent behavior underlying the concept of Nash equilibrium is inappropriate. Instead, we observe behavior to be coordinated and correlated. Statistical tests reject Nash equilibrium as an explanation of observed play. The coalition proof correlated equilibrium of the game, however, explains the data when the possibility of errors by players is introduced. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92. © 1998 Academic Press.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Games and Economic Behavior	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1006/game.1997.0624	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory	en_US
dc.title	An experimental study of communication and coordination in noncooperative games	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	1-2	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	24	en_US
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.issue	1-2	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	24	en_US

Abstract:

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test the usefulness of alternative solution concepts to explain players' behavior in noncooperative games with preplay communication. In the experiment subjects communicate by plain conversation prior to playing a simple game. In this setting, we find that the presumption of individualistic and independent behavior underlying the concept of Nash equilibrium is inappropriate. Instead, we observe behavior to be coordinated and correlated. Statistical tests reject Nash equilibrium as an explanation of observed play. The coalition proof correlated equilibrium of the game, however, explains the data when the possibility of errors by players is introduced. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92. © 1998 Academic Press.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/15753