Loss aversion and lying behavior

Garbarino, E; Slonim, R; Villeval, MC

Loss aversion and lying behavior

Garbarino, E Slonim, R Villeval, MC

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Publisher:: Elsevier BV
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2019, 158, pp. 379-393
Issue Date:: 2019-02-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Garbarino, E
dc.contributor.author	Slonim, R
dc.contributor.author	Villeval, MC
dc.date.accessioned	2022-09-26T05:36:25Z
dc.date.available	2022-09-26T05:36:25Z
dc.date.issued	2019-02-01
dc.identifier.citation	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2019, 158, pp. 379-393
dc.identifier.issn	0167-2681
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/162090
dc.description.abstract	We theoretically show that loss-averse agents are more likely to lie to avoid receiving a low payoff after a random draw the lower the ex-ante probability of this bad outcome. The ex-ante expected payoff increases as the bad outcome becomes less likely, and hence the greater is the loss avoided by lying. We demonstrate robust support for this theory by reanalyzing the results from the extant literature and with a new experiment that varies the outcome probabilities and is run double-anonymous.
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Elsevier BV
dc.relation.ispartof	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.008
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject	1401 Economic Theory, 1402 Applied Economics, 1403 Econometrics
dc.subject.classification	Economics
dc.title	Loss aversion and lying behavior
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	158
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics
utslib.for	1403 Econometrics
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
dc.date.updated	2022-09-26T05:36:24Z
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	158

Abstract:

We theoretically show that loss-averse agents are more likely to lie to avoid receiving a low payoff after a random draw the lower the ex-ante probability of this bad outcome. The ex-ante expected payoff increases as the bad outcome becomes less likely, and hence the greater is the loss avoided by lying. We demonstrate robust support for this theory by reanalyzing the results from the extant literature and with a new experiment that varies the outcome probabilities and is run double-anonymous.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/162090