Do agents maximise? Risk taking on first and second serves in tennis

Ely, J; Gauriot, R; Page, L

Do agents maximise? Risk taking on first and second serves in tennis

Ely, J Gauriot, R Page, L

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Publisher:: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Journal of Economic Psychology, 2017, 63, pp. 135-142
Issue Date:: 2017-12-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Ely, J
dc.contributor.author	Gauriot, R
dc.contributor.author	Page, L https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6020-9733
dc.date.accessioned	2022-10-03T05:24:17Z
dc.date.available	2022-10-03T05:24:17Z
dc.date.issued	2017-12-01
dc.identifier.citation	Journal of Economic Psychology, 2017, 63, pp. 135-142
dc.identifier.issn	0167-4870
dc.identifier.issn	1872-7719
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/162227
dc.description.abstract	We investigate whether expert players with high incentives are able to optimally determine their degree of risk taking in contest. We use a large dataset on tennis matches and look at players’ risk taking on first and second serves. We isolate a specific situation, let serves, where second serves and first serves occur in a way which is as good as random. This creates the setting of a quasi-experiment which we can use to study players’ serving strategies on first and second serves in comparable serving situations. We find that players, both men and women, are able to adopt serving strategies which meet the requirements of optimality arising from simple assumptions about risk-return trade-offs in serves.
dc.language	English
dc.publisher	ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
dc.relation.ispartof	Journal of Economic Psychology
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.joep.2017.02.006
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject.classification	Economics
dc.title	Do agents maximise? Risk taking on first and second serves in tennis
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	63
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
dc.date.updated	2022-10-03T05:24:15Z
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	63

Abstract:

We investigate whether expert players with high incentives are able to optimally determine their degree of risk taking in contest. We use a large dataset on tennis matches and look at players’ risk taking on first and second serves. We isolate a specific situation, let serves, where second serves and first serves occur in a way which is as good as random. This creates the setting of a quasi-experiment which we can use to study players’ serving strategies on first and second serves in comparable serving situations. We find that players, both men and women, are able to adopt serving strategies which meet the requirements of optimality arising from simple assumptions about risk-return trade-offs in serves.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/162227