Self-serving dishonesty: The role of confidence in driving dishonesty

Heger, SA; Slonim, R; Tausch, F

Self-serving dishonesty: The role of confidence in driving dishonesty

Heger, SA Slonim, R Tausch, F

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Publisher:: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2022, 64, (3), pp. 235-250
Issue Date:: 2022-06-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Heger, SA
dc.contributor.author	Slonim, R
dc.contributor.author	Tausch, F
dc.date.accessioned	2022-12-07T00:04:38Z
dc.date.available	2022-12-07T00:04:38Z
dc.date.issued	2022-06-01
dc.identifier.citation	Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2022, 64, (3), pp. 235-250
dc.identifier.issn	0895-5646
dc.identifier.issn	1573-0476
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/164173
dc.description.abstract	Ambiguity and uncertainty as an explanation for ethical blind spots is well-documented. We contribute to this line of research by showing that these blind spots arise even when there is naturally occurring uncertainty—that is, when individuals are simply uncertain of the truth they “fill-in” this uncertainty in a self-serving way. To examine self-serving dishonesty, we asked a sample of U.S. car owners to respond to an auto insurance underwriting questionnaire that affects their price of insurance (i.e., premium), and investigated how financial incentives affect the honesty of their responses. We find, consistent with the current literature, that people have a strong preference for truthfulness, but only when they are confident of the objective truth. However, when people are not completely certain of the objectively correct answer, significant dishonesty occurs in a self-serving manner. We also find that reports of confidence do not depend on incentives and thus self-serving dishonesty is not strategic.
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Springer Science and Business Media LLC
dc.relation.ispartof	Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1007/s11166-022-09380-1
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject	1402 Applied Economics, 1502 Banking, Finance and Investment
dc.subject.classification	Economics
dc.title	Self-serving dishonesty: The role of confidence in driving dishonesty
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	64
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics
utslib.for	1502 Banking, Finance and Investment
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
dc.date.updated	2022-12-07T00:04:30Z
pubs.issue	3
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	64
utslib.citation.issue	3

Abstract:

Ambiguity and uncertainty as an explanation for ethical blind spots is well-documented. We contribute to this line of research by showing that these blind spots arise even when there is naturally occurring uncertainty—that is, when individuals are simply uncertain of the truth they “fill-in” this uncertainty in a self-serving way. To examine self-serving dishonesty, we asked a sample of U.S. car owners to respond to an auto insurance underwriting questionnaire that affects their price of insurance (i.e., premium), and investigated how financial incentives affect the honesty of their responses. We find, consistent with the current literature, that people have a strong preference for truthfulness, but only when they are confident of the objective truth. However, when people are not completely certain of the objectively correct answer, significant dishonesty occurs in a self-serving manner. We also find that reports of confidence do not depend on incentives and thus self-serving dishonesty is not strategic.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/164173