A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources

Bu, N

A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources

Bu, N

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Publisher:: Elsevier
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Mathematical Social Sciences, 2022, 120, pp. 1-7
Issue Date:: 2022-11

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Bu, N
dc.date.accessioned	2023-03-28T01:42:37Z
dc.date.available	2023-03-28T01:42:37Z
dc.date.issued	2022-11
dc.identifier.citation	Mathematical Social Sciences, 2022, 120, pp. 1-7
dc.identifier.issn	0165-4896
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/168654
dc.description.abstract	We study the problem of assigning objects. There may be multiple copies of each object. Each agent is assigned at most one. Monetary transfer is not allowed. We require a rule to be fair and efficient. We introduce an axiom that is a natural weakening of no-envy. We call it “bounded no-envy”. It states that for each pair of agents who receive objects of the same rank in their respective preferences, each of them should find his assignment at least as desirable as the other’s. Bounded no-envy is compatible with Pareto efficiency. In particular, the immediate acceptance rules (a.k.a. the “Boston mechanisms”) satisfy both. Our main result is that the immediate acceptance rules are the only rules satisfying weak non-wastefulness, bounded no-envy, rank-respecting invariance, resource monotonicity, and bilateral consistency.
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Elsevier
dc.relation.ispartof	Mathematical Social Sciences
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.08.002
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject	01 Mathematical Sciences, 14 Economics, 16 Studies in Human Society
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory
dc.title	A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	120
utslib.for	01 Mathematical Sciences
utslib.for	14 Economics
utslib.for	16 Studies in Human Society
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
dc.date.updated	2023-03-28T01:42:36Z
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	120

Abstract:

We study the problem of assigning objects. There may be multiple copies of each object. Each agent is assigned at most one. Monetary transfer is not allowed. We require a rule to be fair and efficient. We introduce an axiom that is a natural weakening of no-envy. We call it “bounded no-envy”. It states that for each pair of agents who receive objects of the same rank in their respective preferences, each of them should find his assignment at least as desirable as the other’s. Bounded no-envy is compatible with Pareto efficiency. In particular, the immediate acceptance rules (a.k.a. the “Boston mechanisms”) satisfy both. Our main result is that the immediate acceptance rules are the only rules satisfying weak non-wastefulness, bounded no-envy, rank-respecting invariance, resource monotonicity, and bilateral consistency.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/168654