Dual-Class Share Structures versus Staggered Boards
- Publication Type:
- Thesis
- Issue Date:
- 2023
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This thesis contributes to the ongoing debate around the tradeoffs arising from antitakeover provisions, by presenting a comparative analysis using more comprehensive and accurate dual-class and staggered boards indicator variables. In particular, we find that R&D activity positively affects firm valuations for dual-class firms, but a negative effect for staggered board firms. We find that dual-class firms have a strong propensity to fund R&D by issuing new equity, whereas there is no evidence that staggered board firms use equity to fund their R&D activities. With respect to debt maturity, we observe a higher propensity among dual-class firms to fund themselves with short-maturity debt, while staggered board firms show a preference for long-maturity debt. We also find that the preference for short-maturity debt is less pronounced among innovative dual-class firms, while the situation is reversed among innovative staggered board firms. When it comes to institutional ownership, we observe that staggered board firms appear to be quite attractive to institutional investors, whereas dual-class firms seem especially unattractive to them. We also find that institutional investor aversion to dual-class firms is intensified by R&D investments, whereas R&D activity seems to have no impact on their willingness to invest in staggered board firms.
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