Contractual complexity, governance and organisational form in alliances

Schweitzer, J; Gudergan, S

Contractual complexity, governance and organisational form in alliances

Schweitzer, J

Gudergan, S

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Publisher:: Inderscience Publishers
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: International Journal of Strategic Business Alliances, 2011, 2 (1/2), pp. 26 - 40
Issue Date:: 2011-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Schweitzer, J https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3145-721X	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Gudergan, S	en_US
dc.date.issued	2011-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	International Journal of Strategic Business Alliances, 2011, 2 (1/2), pp. 26 - 40	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1756-6444	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/17492
dc.description.abstract	Contracting and governance related issues are critical for the success of alliances. In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework to describe the role of the contractual complexity of alliance agreements for the governance and organisational form of alliances. We suggest control theory to explain how the goal incongruence and performance ambiguity among collaborating partners, in conjunction with the complexity of their contractual agreements, affect the organisational form of alliances that can be characterised as bureaucracy, market, clan, or adhocracy. Our framework implies that managers who review and control contractual complexity, goal incongruence, and performance ambiguity, will be able to identify and employ governance for their alliances that better supports their firm's strategic intentions.	en_US
dc.publisher	Inderscience Publishers	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	International Journal of Strategic Business Alliances	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1504/IJSBA.2011.038132	en_US
dc.title	Contractual complexity, governance and organisational form in alliances	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	1/2	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	2	en_US
utslib.for	1503 Business and Management	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.consider-herdc	true	en_US
pubs.issue	1/2	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	2	en_US

Abstract:

Contracting and governance related issues are critical for the success of alliances. In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework to describe the role of the contractual complexity of alliance agreements for the governance and organisational form of alliances. We suggest control theory to explain how the goal incongruence and performance ambiguity among collaborating partners, in conjunction with the complexity of their contractual agreements, affect the organisational form of alliances that can be characterised as bureaucracy, market, clan, or adhocracy. Our framework implies that managers who review and control contractual complexity, goal incongruence, and performance ambiguity, will be able to identify and employ governance for their alliances that better supports their firm's strategic intentions.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/17492