Creating a new sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism: why incentives, risk sharing, and CACs will all matter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Publication Type:
- Journal Article
- Citation:
- Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2023, 39, (2), pp. 367-378
- Issue Date:
- 2023-01-01
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| Filename | Description | Size | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| grad012.pdf | Published version | 911.11 kB |
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This paper argues that the Covid recession, and aggressive monetary tightening in the US accompanying the post-Covid recovery, are likely to cause a sovereign debt overhang in emerging market economies—i.e. debt which is unlikely to be fully repaid. A sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism (SDRM) seems necessary to avoid widespread disorderly debt write-downs. We discuss a range of procedures that are available, building upon Anne Krueger’s proposal for an SDRM in 2002 (Krueger, 2002a,b). At that time Krugman (1988) had already argued that any SDRM should incentivize debtors so that they put in effort to clear their debts (a Krugman contract). Menzies (2004) went further than this to show that these effects should be further sharpened, creating what he called ‘hyper-incentive effects’ (a Menzies contract). The International Monetary Fund has argued that risk-sharing between debtors and creditors will also be important (IMF, 2020). But we show that risk-sharing will—in general—pull in the opposite direction to incentive effects, and we doubt the extent to which the IMF has recognized this trade-off. Finally, we argue that collective action clauses (CACs) increase the probability of achieving any agreement, whatever it might be. They will help avoid the alternative of disorderly debt write-downs, outcomes which will deliver neither incentive effects nor risk-sharing.
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