Efficient Market Design with Distributional Objectives

Hafalir, I; Kojima, F; Bumin Yenmez, M

Efficient Market Design with Distributional Objectives

Hafalir, I

Kojima, F Bumin Yenmez, M

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Publisher:: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Publication Type:: Conference Proceeding
Citation:: EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023, pp. 849
Issue Date:: 2023-07-09

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.advisor	ACM 2023. This is the author's version of the work. Efficient Market Design with Distributional Objectives It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pagination: 849 Publication date: 09 Jul 2023 DIO: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3580507.3597716
dc.contributor.author	Hafalir, I https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6731-2848
dc.contributor.author	Kojima, F
dc.contributor.author	Bumin Yenmez, M
dc.date.accessioned	2024-03-04T21:16:43Z
dc.date.available	2024-03-04T21:16:43Z
dc.date.issued	2023-07-09
dc.identifier.citation	EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023, pp. 849
dc.identifier.isbn	9798400701047
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/176082
dc.description.abstract	In a matching market with distributional objectives, we study the existence of mechanisms that weakly improve the distributional objective (compared to a status-quo matching), and satisfy constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
dc.relation.ispartof	EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
dc.relation.ispartof	Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1145/3580507.3597716
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights	© ACM 2023. This is the author's version of the work. Efficient Market Design with Distributional Objectives It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in EC '23: Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pagination p. 849 Publication date 07 July 2023 https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3580507.3597716
dc.title	Efficient Market Design with Distributional Objectives
dc.type	Conference Proceeding
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
dc.date.updated	2024-03-04T21:16:42Z
pubs.publication-status	Published

Abstract:

In a matching market with distributional objectives, we study the existence of mechanisms that weakly improve the distributional objective (compared to a status-quo matching), and satisfy constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/176082