Mechanism design with informational punishment

Balzer, B; Schneider, J

Mechanism design with informational punishment

Balzer, B

Schneider, J

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Publisher:: Elsevier
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, 140, pp. 197-209
Issue Date:: 2023-07-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Balzer, B https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9508-8487
dc.contributor.author	Schneider, J
dc.date.accessioned	2024-03-07T07:01:24Z
dc.date.available	2024-03-07T07:01:24Z
dc.date.issued	2023-07-01
dc.identifier.citation	Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, 140, pp. 197-209
dc.identifier.issn	0899-8256
dc.identifier.issn	1090-2473
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/176295
dc.description.abstract	We introduce informational punishment to the design of mechanisms that compete with an exogenous status quo mechanism: Players can send garbled public messages with some delay and others cannot commit to ignoring them. Optimal informational punishment ensures that full participation is without loss, even if any single player can publicly enforce the status quo mechanism. Informational punishment permits using a standard revelation principle, is independent of the mechanism designer's objective, and operates exclusively off the equilibrium path. It is robust to refinements and applies in informed-principal settings. We provide conditions that make it robust to opportunistic signal designers.
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Elsevier
dc.relation.ispartof	Games and Economic Behavior
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.012
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject	1401 Economic Theory, 1402 Applied Economics
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory
dc.subject.classification	3801 Applied economics
dc.subject.classification	3803 Economic theory
dc.title	Mechanism design with informational punishment
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	140
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
dc.date.updated	2024-03-07T07:01:23Z
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	140

Abstract:

We introduce informational punishment to the design of mechanisms that compete with an exogenous status quo mechanism: Players can send garbled public messages with some delay and others cannot commit to ignoring them. Optimal informational punishment ensures that full participation is without loss, even if any single player can publicly enforce the status quo mechanism. Informational punishment permits using a standard revelation principle, is independent of the mechanism designer's objective, and operates exclusively off the equilibrium path. It is robust to refinements and applies in informed-principal settings. We provide conditions that make it robust to opportunistic signal designers.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/176295