Dissent in Australian director elections : causes and consequences
- Publication Type:
- Thesis
- Issue Date:
- 2024
Open Access
Copyright Clearance Process
- Recently Added
- In Progress
- Open Access
This item is open access.
This thesis investigates the determinants and consequences of shareholder dissent in director elections at annual general meetings. Using Australian voting information, this thesis provides evidence that shareholder dissent is significantly associated with firm performance, corporate governance structure, and director characteristics. Additional analysis reveals that while both vote against and vote abstain are options for shareholders to express their displeasure with boards, a greater number of factors are statistically significant when shareholders have the option to vote against. The consequence analysis shows that shareholder dissent, using against votes, is positively associated with an increased likelihood of director, board, and CEO turnover, and negatively associated with subsequent firm performance. However, the results using abstain votes are insignificant, suggesting that firms view the signal sent by abstain votes differently from that sent through against votes. This thesis contributes to concerns about Australian shareholder engagement at general meetings, and it provides insights into the global debate on election reforms from the plurality to majority voting system in other jurisdictions.
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
