Authenticated Encryption for Space Telemetry

Savchenko, A

Authenticated Encryption for Space Telemetry

Savchenko, A

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Publisher:: International Astronautical Federation (IAF)
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Space Communications and Navigation Symposium (IAF 2025), 2025, 1, pp. 553-563
Issue Date:: 2025-09-29

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Full metadata record

Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Savchenko, A https://orcid.org/0009-0009-4030-3667
dc.date.accessioned	2026-01-30T07:30:05Z
dc.date.available	2025-04-26
dc.date.available	2026-01-30T07:30:05Z
dc.date.issued	2025-09-29
dc.identifier.citation	Space Communications and Navigation Symposium (IAF 2025), 2025, 1, pp. 553-563
dc.identifier.isbn	9798331329303
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/192645
dc.description.abstract	We explore how command stack protection requirements outlined in NASA-STD-1006A can be satisfied within the context of emergency space telemetry. Proposed implementation of lightweight authenticated encryption offers strong security without sacrificing performance in resource-constrained environments. It produces fixed-length messages, maintaining compatibility with the underlying data transport protocols. By focusing on predictable properties and robust authentication, we create a scheme that protects the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of telemetry data in emergency communications while balancing security requirements with the operational constraints.
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	International Astronautical Federation (IAF)
dc.relation.ispartof	Space Communications and Navigation Symposium (IAF 2025)
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.52202/083082-0066
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.title	Authenticated Encryption for Space Telemetry
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	1
utslib.location.activity	Australia
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Computer Science
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/Engineering and IT Related HDR Students
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
pubs.consider-herdc	true
dc.date.updated	2026-01-30T07:30:04Z
pubs.publication-status	Published online
pubs.volume	1

Abstract:

We explore how command stack protection requirements outlined in NASA-STD-1006A can be satisfied within the context of emergency space telemetry. Proposed implementation of lightweight authenticated encryption offers strong security without sacrificing performance in resource-constrained environments. It produces fixed-length messages, maintaining compatibility with the underlying data transport protocols. By focusing on predictable properties and robust authentication, we create a scheme that protects the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of telemetry data in emergency communications while balancing security requirements with the operational constraints.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/192645