One or two monies?

Dong, M; Jiang, JH

One or two monies?

Dong, M Jiang, JH

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Publisher:: Elsevier
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Journal of Monetary Economics, 2010, 57 (4), pp. 439 - 450
Issue Date:: 2010-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Dong, M	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Jiang, JH	en_US
dc.date.issued	2010-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Journal of Monetary Economics, 2010, 57 (4), pp. 439 - 450	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0304-3932	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/22632
dc.description.abstract	The set of incentive-feasible allocations is examined in a dynamic quasi-linear environment where agents lack commitment and have private information over their idiosyncratic characteristics. When record-keeping is available, the first-best allocation is implementable in a set of sufficiently patient economies. When record-keeping is limited to one money, this set is strictly smaller-except when private information is absent. When record-keeping is expanded, but limited to two monies, the set of economies for which the first-best is implementable corresponds to that of record-keeping, even when private information is present. We further demonstrate that two monies are a perfect substitute for record-keeping.	en_US
dc.publisher	Elsevier	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Journal of Monetary Economics	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.04.002	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economics	en_US
dc.title	One or two monies?	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	4	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	57	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory	en_US
utslib.for	1403 Econometrics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.consider-herdc	false	en_US
pubs.issue	4	en_US
pubs.volume	57	en_US

Abstract:

The set of incentive-feasible allocations is examined in a dynamic quasi-linear environment where agents lack commitment and have private information over their idiosyncratic characteristics. When record-keeping is available, the first-best allocation is implementable in a set of sufficiently patient economies. When record-keeping is limited to one money, this set is strictly smaller-except when private information is absent. When record-keeping is expanded, but limited to two monies, the set of economies for which the first-best is implementable corresponds to that of record-keeping, even when private information is present. We further demonstrate that two monies are a perfect substitute for record-keeping.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/22632