Collusion in auctions for emission permits: An experimental analysis

Burtraw, D; Goeree, J; Holt, CA; Myers, E; Palmer, K; Shobe, W

Collusion in auctions for emission permits: An experimental analysis

Burtraw, D Goeree, J

Holt, CA Myers, E Palmer, K Shobe, W

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2009, 28 (4), pp. 672 - 691
Issue Date:: 2009-12-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Burtraw, D	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Goeree, J https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9876-3425	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Holt, CA	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Myers, E	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Palmer, K	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Shobe, W	en_US
dc.date.issued	2009-12-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2009, 28 (4), pp. 672 - 691	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0276-8739	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/29194
dc.description.abstract	Environmental markets have several institutional features that provide a new context for the use of auctions and that have not been studied previously. This paper reports on laboratory experiments testing three auction forms-uniform and discriminatory price sealed-bid auctions and an ascending clock auction. We test the ability of subjects to tacitly or explicitly collude in order to maximize profits. Our main result is that the discriminatory and uniform price auctions produce greater revenues than the clock auction, both with and without explicit communication. The clock appears to facilitate successful collusion, both because of its sequential structure and because it allows bidders to focus on one dimension of cooperation (quantity) rather than two (price and quantity). © 2009 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Journal of Policy Analysis and Management	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1002/pam.20460	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economics	en_US
dc.title	Collusion in auctions for emission permits: An experimental analysis	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	4	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	28	en_US
utslib.for	1606 Political Science	en_US
utslib.for	1605 Policy and Administration	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.issue	4	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	28	en_US

Abstract:

Environmental markets have several institutional features that provide a new context for the use of auctions and that have not been studied previously. This paper reports on laboratory experiments testing three auction forms-uniform and discriminatory price sealed-bid auctions and an ascending clock auction. We test the ability of subjects to tacitly or explicitly collude in order to maximize profits. Our main result is that the discriminatory and uniform price auctions produce greater revenues than the clock auction, both with and without explicit communication. The clock appears to facilitate successful collusion, both because of its sequential structure and because it allows bidders to focus on one dimension of cooperation (quantity) rather than two (price and quantity). © 2009 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/29194