Experts, conflicts of interest, and reputation for ability

Pavesi, F; Scotti, M

Experts, conflicts of interest, and reputation for ability

Pavesi, F Scotti, M

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: International Journal of Economic Theory, 2014, 10 (2), pp. 219 - 233
Issue Date:: 2014-01-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Pavesi, F	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Scotti, M https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1179-6521	en_US
dc.date.available	2020-05-25T19:11:13Z
dc.date.issued	2014-01-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	International Journal of Economic Theory, 2014, 10 (2), pp. 219 - 233	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1742-7355	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/30219
dc.description.abstract	We analyze a model of cheap talk in which an expert who faces a conflict of interest with a decision maker is concerned about establishing a reputation for having accurate information. In this environment, an increase in reputation above a certain threshold always makes truthful revelation more difficult to achieve, since experts with greater reputation can more easily sway the beliefs of decision makers in a desired direction. Thus, higher levels of reputation exacerbate the incentives of biased experts to misreport their private information. Decision makers may therefore be better off consulting less reputable experts when conflicts are more pronounced. © IAET.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	International Journal of Economic Theory	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1111/ijet.12037	en_US
dc.title	Experts, conflicts of interest, and reputation for ability	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	2	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	10	en_US
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access
pubs.issue	2	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	10	en_US

Abstract:

We analyze a model of cheap talk in which an expert who faces a conflict of interest with a decision maker is concerned about establishing a reputation for having accurate information. In this environment, an increase in reputation above a certain threshold always makes truthful revelation more difficult to achieve, since experts with greater reputation can more easily sway the beliefs of decision makers in a desired direction. Thus, higher levels of reputation exacerbate the incentives of biased experts to misreport their private information. Decision makers may therefore be better off consulting less reputable experts when conflicts are more pronounced. © IAET.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/30219