International Environmental Agreement formation and trade

Dong, B; Zhao, X

International Environmental Agreement formation and trade

Dong, B Zhao, X

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2009, 16 (3), pp. 339 - 356
Issue Date:: 2009-01-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Dong, B	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Zhao, X https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3103-8688	en_US
dc.date.issued	2009-01-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2009, 16 (3), pp. 339 - 356	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1608-1625	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/50812
dc.description.abstract	This paper examines self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) in an open economy environment. Using an extended model of Barrett (1994), we show that: (i) equilibrium tariff is positive; (ii) the endogenously determined size and the effectiveness of an multilateral IEA are the tradeoff of four effects, i.e. entry effect, level effect, leakage effect, and tariff effect. The paper also offers an alternative explanation for the minimum participation clause adopted by most IEAs that is consistent with the mandate of an IEA.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1080/16081625.2009.9720847	en_US
dc.title	International Environmental Agreement formation and trade	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	3	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	16	en_US
utslib.for	14 Economics	en_US
utslib.for	15 Commerce, Management, Tourism and Services	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.issue	3	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	16	en_US

Abstract:

This paper examines self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) in an open economy environment. Using an extended model of Barrett (1994), we show that: (i) equilibrium tariff is positive; (ii) the endogenously determined size and the effectiveness of an multilateral IEA are the tradeoff of four effects, i.e. entry effect, level effect, leakage effect, and tariff effect. The paper also offers an alternative explanation for the minimum participation clause adopted by most IEAs that is consistent with the mandate of an IEA.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/50812