Moral hazard and adverse selection in Australian private hospitals: 1989-1990

Savage, E; Wright, DJ

Moral hazard and adverse selection in Australian private hospitals: 1989-1990

Savage, E

Wright, DJ

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Journal of Health Economics, 2003, 22 (3), pp. 331 - 359
Issue Date:: 2003-05-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Savage, E https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2690-3975	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Wright, DJ	en_US
dc.date.issued	2003-05-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Journal of Health Economics, 2003, 22 (3), pp. 331 - 359	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0167-6296	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/5101
dc.description.abstract	The Australian hospital system is characterized by the co-existence of private hospitals, where individuals pay for services and public hospitals, where services are free to all but delivered after a waiting time. The decision to purchase insurance for private hospital treatment depends on the trade-off between the price of treatment, waiting time, and the insurance premium. Clearly, the potential for adverse selection and moral hazard exists. When the endogeneity of the insurance decision is accounted for, the extent of moral hazard can substantially increase the expected length of a hospital stay by a factor of up to 3. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Journal of Health Economics	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/S0167-6296(02)00104-2	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Health Policy & Services	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Humans	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Length of Stay	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Models, Statistical	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Proportional Hazards Models	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Family Characteristics	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Decision Making	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Health Status	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Adult	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Aged	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Middle Aged	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Income	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Hospitals, Private	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Hospitals, Public	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Insurance, Hospitalization	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Insurance Selection Bias	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Health Services Research	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	National Health Programs	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Consumer Satisfaction	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Australia	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Female	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Male	en_US
dc.subject.mesh	Consumer Behavior	en_US
dc.title	Moral hazard and adverse selection in Australian private hospitals: 1989-1990	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	3	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	22	en_US
utslib.for	140208 Health Economics	en_US
utslib.for	1117 Public Health and Health Services	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
utslib.for	1403 Econometrics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.issue	3	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	22	en_US

Abstract:

The Australian hospital system is characterized by the co-existence of private hospitals, where individuals pay for services and public hospitals, where services are free to all but delivered after a waiting time. The decision to purchase insurance for private hospital treatment depends on the trade-off between the price of treatment, waiting time, and the insurance premium. Clearly, the potential for adverse selection and moral hazard exists. When the endogeneity of the insurance decision is accounted for, the extent of moral hazard can substantially increase the expected length of a hospital stay by a factor of up to 3. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/5101