A game theoretical model of international fishing with time delay

Szidarovszky, F; Engel, A; Chiarella, C

A game theoretical model of international fishing with time delay

Szidarovszky, F Engel, A Chiarella, C

Permalink

Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: International Game Theory Review, 2004, 6 (3), pp. 391 - 415
Issue Date:: 2004-09-01

Closed Access

	Filename	Description	Size
	2004000490.pdf		955.18 kB	Adobe PDF	View/Open

Copyright Clearance Process

Recently Added
In Progress
Closed Access

This item is closed access and not available.

Full metadata record

Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Szidarovszky, F	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Engel, A	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Chiarella, C	en_US
dc.date.issued	2004-09-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	International Game Theory Review, 2004, 6 (3), pp. 391 - 415	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0219-1989	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/5119
dc.description.abstract	This paper studies the evolution of a fish stock that is exploited by an n-country oligopoly. A feature of the economic structure is that the countries exploiting the fish stock experience time lags in obtaining and implementing information on the fish stock. The local asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium is analyzed, including asymptotic stability, instability, and cyclical behavior. Under the assumption of symmetric countries, two special cases are examined in detail. In the first case identical time delays are assumed, and in the second case it is assumed that one country has a different time delay from the others. This semi-symmetric case gives some insight into the consequence of asymmetry of the countries on the asymptotic behavior of the fish stock.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	International Game Theory Review	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1142/S0219198904000277	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory	en_US
dc.title	A game theoretical model of international fishing with time delay	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	3	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	6	en_US
utslib.for	140199 Economic Theory not elsewhere classified	en_US
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.issue	3	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	6	en_US

Abstract:

This paper studies the evolution of a fish stock that is exploited by an n-country oligopoly. A feature of the economic structure is that the countries exploiting the fish stock experience time lags in obtaining and implementing information on the fish stock. The local asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium is analyzed, including asymptotic stability, instability, and cyclical behavior. Under the assumption of symmetric countries, two special cases are examined in detail. In the first case identical time delays are assumed, and in the second case it is assumed that one country has a different time delay from the others. This semi-symmetric case gives some insight into the consequence of asymmetry of the countries on the asymptotic behavior of the fish stock.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/5119