A game theoretical model of international fishing with time delay

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Journal Article
International Game Theory Review, 2004, 6 (3), pp. 391 - 415
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This paper studies the evolution of a fish stock that is exploited by an n-country oligopoly. A feature of the economic structure is that the countries exploiting the fish stock experience time lags in obtaining and implementing information on the fish stock. The local asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium is analyzed, including asymptotic stability, instability, and cyclical behavior. Under the assumption of symmetric countries, two special cases are examined in detail. In the first case identical time delays are assumed, and in the second case it is assumed that one country has a different time delay from the others. This semi-symmetric case gives some insight into the consequence of asymmetry of the countries on the asymptotic behavior of the fish stock.
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