Reminder game: Indirectness in persuasion

Suzuki, T

Reminder game: Indirectness in persuasion

Suzuki, T

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, 100 pp. 240 - 256
Issue Date:: 2016-11-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Suzuki, T https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1804-7416	en_US
dc.date.issued	2016-11-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, 100 pp. 240 - 256	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0899-8256	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/66130
dc.description.abstract	© 2016 Elsevier Inc. A seller wants a buyer to choose a good whose value is the seller's private information. The buyer's memory is limited, and she decides whether to remember the good conditional on a signal about the value. The seller then decides whether to send a costless message that can remind the buyer of the good. Since the reminder could convey the seller's private information in equilibrium, whether to send a reminder is a non-trivial question. It is shown that costless messages can be informative in equilibrium in spite of the strong conflict of interest between the players. In any informative equilibrium, silence conveys positive information about the value, whereas the reminder conveys negative information.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Games and Economic Behavior	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.011	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory	en_US
dc.title	Reminder game: Indirectness in persuasion	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	100	en_US
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	100	en_US

Abstract:

© 2016 Elsevier Inc. A seller wants a buyer to choose a good whose value is the seller's private information. The buyer's memory is limited, and she decides whether to remember the good conditional on a signal about the value. The seller then decides whether to send a costless message that can remind the buyer of the good. Since the reminder could convey the seller's private information in equilibrium, whether to send a reminder is a non-trivial question. It is shown that costless messages can be informative in equilibrium in spite of the strong conflict of interest between the players. In any informative equilibrium, silence conveys positive information about the value, whereas the reminder conveys negative information.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/66130