Jury voting without objective probability

Publisher:
Springer
Publication Type:
Journal Article
Citation:
Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, 46 (2), pp. 389 - 406
Issue Date:
2016-02-01
Full metadata record
Files in This Item:
Filename Description Size
607E5F7A-C1E4-4848-900F-AA87887E0BD4 am.pdfAccepted Manuscript Version919.97 kB
Adobe PDF
© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. Unlike in the standard jury voting experiment, the voting environment in practice has no explicit signal structure. Voters then need to conceptualize the information structure in order to update their beliefs based on “pivotal reasoning”. This paper investigates whether voters can play a strategic voting under a “detail-free” environment. We obtain non-parametric predictions in terms of the differences in voting behaviors under majority and unanimity rule. Our experimental results suggest that voters can still play the strategic voting as in the existing experiments.
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: