Jury voting without objective probability

Li, KK; Suzuki, T

Jury voting without objective probability

Li, KK Suzuki, T

Permalink

Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, 46 (2), pp. 389 - 406
Issue Date:: 2016-02-01

Open Access

Copyright Clearance Process

Recently Added
In Progress
Open Access

This item is open access.

Adobe PDF

Download Accepted Manuscript VersionAdobe PDF (919.97 kB)

View on publisher's site

View statistics

Full metadata record

Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Li, KK	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Suzuki, T https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1804-7416	en_US
dc.date.issued	2016-02-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, 46 (2), pp. 389 - 406	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0176-1714	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/77679
dc.description.abstract	© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. Unlike in the standard jury voting experiment, the voting environment in practice has no explicit signal structure. Voters then need to conceptualize the information structure in order to update their beliefs based on “pivotal reasoning”. This paper investigates whether voters can play a strategic voting under a “detail-free” environment. We obtain non-parametric predictions in terms of the differences in voting behaviors under majority and unanimity rule. Our experimental results suggest that voters can still play the strategic voting as in the existing experiments.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Social Choice and Welfare	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1007/s00355-015-0918-z	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory	en_US
dc.title	Jury voting without objective probability	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	2	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	46	en_US
utslib.for	140104 Microeconomic Theory	en_US
utslib.for	01 Mathematical Sciences	en_US
utslib.for	14 Economics	en_US
utslib.for	16 Studies in Human Society	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access
pubs.issue	2	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	46	en_US

Abstract:

© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. Unlike in the standard jury voting experiment, the voting environment in practice has no explicit signal structure. Voters then need to conceptualize the information structure in order to update their beliefs based on “pivotal reasoning”. This paper investigates whether voters can play a strategic voting under a “detail-free” environment. We obtain non-parametric predictions in terms of the differences in voting behaviors under majority and unanimity rule. Our experimental results suggest that voters can still play the strategic voting as in the existing experiments.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/77679