Quantal Response Equilibrium – A Stochastic Theory of Games

Goeree, J; Holt, C; Palfrey, T

Quantal Response Equilibrium – A Stochastic Theory of Games

Goeree, J

Holt, C Palfrey, T

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Publisher:: Princeton University Press
Publication Type:: Book
Citation:: 2016
Issue Date:: 2016

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Goeree, J https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9876-3425	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Holt, C	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Palfrey, T	en_US
dc.date.issued	2016	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	2016	en_US
dc.identifier.isbn	9780691124230	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/89374
dc.description.abstract	Quantal Response Equilibrium presents a stochastic theory of games that unites probabilistic choice models developed in psychology and statistics with the Nash equilibrium approach of classical game theory. Nash equilibrium assumes precise and perfect decision making in games, but human behavior is inherently stochastic and people realize that the behavior of others is not perfectly predictable. In contrast, QRE models choice behavior as probabilistic and extends classical game theory into a more realistic and useful framework with broad applications for economics, political science, management, and other social sciences.	en_US
dc.publisher	Princeton University Press	en_US
dc.relation	http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP150104491
dc.title	Quantal Response Equilibrium – A Stochastic Theory of Games	en_US
dc.type	Book
utslib.location	USA	en_US
utslib.for	140104 Microeconomic Theory	en_US
utslib.for	140206 Experimental Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.consider-herdc	true	en_US
pubs.place-of-publication	USA	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US

Abstract:

Quantal Response Equilibrium presents a stochastic theory of games that unites probabilistic choice models developed in psychology and statistics with the Nash equilibrium approach of classical game theory. Nash equilibrium assumes precise and perfect decision making in games, but human behavior is inherently stochastic and people realize that the behavior of others is not perfectly predictable. In contrast, QRE models choice behavior as probabilistic and extends classical game theory into a more realistic and useful framework with broad applications for economics, political science, management, and other social sciences.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/89374