Same process, different outcomes: group performance in an acquiring a company experiment

Casari, M; Zhang, J; Jackson, C

Same process, different outcomes: group performance in an acquiring a company experiment

Casari, M Zhang, J

Jackson, C

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Experimental Economics, 2016, 19 (4), pp. 764 - 791
Issue Date:: 2016-12-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Casari, M	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Zhang, J https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3274-5245	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Jackson, C	en_US
dc.date.available	2020-05-25T19:16:01Z
dc.date.issued	2016-12-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Experimental Economics, 2016, 19 (4), pp. 764 - 791	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1386-4157	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/90338
dc.description.abstract	© 2015, Economic Science Association. It is still an open question when groups perform better than individuals in intellective tasks. We report that in an Acquiring a Company game, what prevailed when there was disagreement among group members was the median proposal and not the best proposal. This aggregation rule explains why groups underperformed with respect to a “truth wins” benchmark and why they performed better than individuals deciding in isolation in a simple version of the task but worse in the more difficult version. Implications are drawn on when to employ groups rather than individuals in decision making.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Experimental Economics	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1007/s10683-015-9467-7	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economics	en_US
dc.title	Same process, different outcomes: group performance in an acquiring a company experiment	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	4	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	19	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory	en_US
utslib.for	1505 Marketing	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access
pubs.issue	4	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	19	en_US

Abstract:

© 2015, Economic Science Association. It is still an open question when groups perform better than individuals in intellective tasks. We report that in an Acquiring a Company game, what prevailed when there was disagreement among group members was the median proposal and not the best proposal. This aggregation rule explains why groups underperformed with respect to a “truth wins” benchmark and why they performed better than individuals deciding in isolation in a simple version of the task but worse in the more difficult version. Implications are drawn on when to employ groups rather than individuals in decision making.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/90338