Do Siblings Free-Ride in 'being There' for Parents?

Maruyama, S; Johar, M

Do Siblings Free-Ride in 'being There' for Parents?

Maruyama, S

Johar, M

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Publisher:: Econometric Society
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Quantitative Economics, 2017, 8 (1), pp. 277 - 316
Issue Date:: 2017-03-29

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Maruyama, S https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2945-7437	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Johar, M https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2381-1741	en_US
dc.date.available	2016-02-14	en_US
dc.date.issued	2017-03-29	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Quantitative Economics, 2017, 8 (1), pp. 277 - 316	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1759-7323	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/97221
dc.description.abstract	There is a potential free-rider problem when several siblings consider future provision of care for their elderly parents. Siblings can commit to not providing long-term support by living far away. If location decisions are made by birth order, older siblings may enjoy a Örstmover advantage. We study siblingsílocation decisions relative to their parents by estimating a sequential participation game for US data. We Önd: (1) limited strategic behavior: in two-child families, more than 92% of children have a dominant strategy; and (2) a non-negligible public good problem: in families with multiple children, 18.3% more parents would have had at least one child living nearby had location decisions been made cooperatively	en_US
dc.publisher	Econometric Society	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Quantitative Economics	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.3982/QE389	en_US
dc.title	Do Siblings Free-Ride in 'being There' for Parents?	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	1	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	8	en_US
utslib.for	1403 Econometrics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access
pubs.consider-herdc	true	en_US
pubs.issue	1	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	8	en_US

Abstract:

There is a potential free-rider problem when several siblings consider future provision of care for their elderly parents. Siblings can commit to not providing long-term support by living far away. If location decisions are made by birth order, older siblings may enjoy a Örstmover advantage. We study siblingsílocation decisions relative to their parents by estimating a sequential participation game for US data. We Önd: (1) limited strategic behavior: in two-child families, more than 92% of children have a dominant strategy; and (2) a non-negligible public good problem: in families with multiple children, 18.3% more parents would have had at least one child living nearby had location decisions been made cooperatively

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/97221