Contract duration and the division of labor in agricultural land leases

Yoder, J; Hossain, I; Epplin, F; Doye, D

Contract duration and the division of labor in agricultural land leases

Yoder, J Hossain, I Epplin, F Doye, D

Permalink

Publisher:: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2008, 65 (3-4), pp. 714 - 733
Issue Date:: 2008-01

Closed Access

	Filename	Description	Size
	2006012860OK.pdf		262.15 kB	Adobe PDF	View/Open

Copyright Clearance Process

Recently Added
In Progress
Closed Access

This item is closed access and not available.

Full metadata record

Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Yoder, J	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Hossain, I	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Epplin, F	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Doye, D	en_US
dc.date.issued	2008-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2008, 65 (3-4), pp. 714 - 733	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0167-2681	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/9935
dc.description.abstract	Short-term contracts provide weak incentives for durable input investment if post-contract asset transfer is difficult. Our model shows that when both agents provide inputs, optimal contract length balances the weak incentives of one agent against the others. This perspective broadens the existing contract duration literature, which emphasizes the tradeoff between risk sharing and contracting costs.We develop hypotheses and test them based on private grazing contracts from the Southern Great Plains. We find broad support for the implications of our model. For example, landowners provide durable land-specific inputs more often under annual than multi-year contracts.	en_US
dc.publisher	Elsevier B.V.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.jebo.2006.02.007	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economics	en_US
dc.title	Contract duration and the division of labor in agricultural land leases	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	3-4	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	65	en_US
utslib.for	140201 Agricultural Economics	en_US
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
utslib.for	1403 Econometrics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.consider-herdc	true	en_US
pubs.issue	3-4	en_US
pubs.volume	65	en_US

Abstract:

Short-term contracts provide weak incentives for durable input investment if post-contract asset transfer is difficult. Our model shows that when both agents provide inputs, optimal contract length balances the weak incentives of one agent against the others. This perspective broadens the existing contract duration literature, which emphasizes the tradeoff between risk sharing and contracting costs.We develop hypotheses and test them based on private grazing contracts from the Southern Great Plains. We find broad support for the implications of our model. For example, landowners provide durable land-specific inputs more often under annual than multi-year contracts.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/9935