Basel II and the Political Economy of Banking

Docherty, PT

Basel II and the Political Economy of Banking

Docherty, PT

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Publisher:: M. E. Sharpe
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: International Journal of Political Economy, 2008, 37 (2), pp. 82 - 106
Issue Date:: 2008-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Docherty, PT https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9975-6435	en_US
dc.date.issued	2008-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	International Journal of Political Economy, 2008, 37 (2), pp. 82 - 106	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0891-1916	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/9958
dc.description.abstract	In January 2008, institutions across the G-lO countries responsible for regulating banks within their jurisdictions implemented the new Basel Capital Accord, now commonly known as Basel II. This new standard for bank regulation replaces the first Basel Accord adopted in 1988 and introduces several innovations designed to improve the effectiveness of bank regulation and to reduce the likelihood of large bank collapses and the associated possibility of financial instability. Such a new policy framework has important implications for welfare and interest rate policy. A framework that successfully reduces the occurrence of financial crises is also likely to reduce the number of damaging episodes of economic downturn (such as that recently observed in the United States as a result of the subprime crisis) 'and the frequency with which monetary policy needs to be called upon to repair the damage of such downturns. Because interest rates affect the distribution of income, these changes also have potential political economy implications.	en_US
dc.publisher	M. E. Sharpe	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	International Journal of Political Economy	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1080/09692290.2011.624976	en_US
dc.title	Basel II and the Political Economy of Banking	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	2	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	37	en_US
utslib.for	140212 Macroeconomics (incl. Monetary and Fiscal Theory)	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.consider-herdc	true	en_US
pubs.issue	2	en_US
pubs.volume	37	en_US

Abstract:

In January 2008, institutions across the G-lO countries responsible for regulating banks within their jurisdictions implemented the new Basel Capital Accord, now commonly known as Basel II. This new standard for bank regulation replaces the first Basel Accord adopted in 1988 and introduces several innovations designed to improve the effectiveness of bank regulation and to reduce the likelihood of large bank collapses and the associated possibility of financial instability. Such a new policy framework has important implications for welfare and interest rate policy. A framework that successfully reduces the occurrence of financial crises is also likely to reduce the number of damaging episodes of economic downturn (such as that recently observed in the United States as a result of the subprime crisis) 'and the frequency with which monetary policy needs to be called upon to repair the damage of such downturns. Because interest rates affect the distribution of income, these changes also have potential political economy implications.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/9958