Existence and uniqueness in Cournot models with cost externalities
- Publisher:
- Mathematical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
- Publication Type:
- Journal Article
- Citation:
- Mathematica Pannonica, 2009, 20 (1), pp. 17 - 25
- Issue Date:
- 2009-01
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In this paper we examine single product Cournot oligopolies, with- out product differentiation, under the assumption that the cost of each firm depends on its own output and also on the output of the rest of the industry. The competition of the firms on the secondary market for manpower, capital, energy, and so forth as well as the spillover effect of the R&D investments of the firms can be taken into account with this more general cost structure. The existence of a unique NashCournot equilibrium is proved under realistic conditions. Our result is a straightforward generalization of the well-known existence and uniqueness theorem of concave oligopolies.
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