First-price auction implements efficient investments

Tomoeda, K

First-price auction implements efficient investments

Tomoeda, K

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Economics Letters, 2017, 159 pp. 198 - 200
Issue Date:: 2017-10-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Tomoeda, K https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6236-7439	en_US
dc.date.available	2020-10-31T18:09:27Z
dc.date.issued	2017-10-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Economics Letters, 2017, 159 pp. 198 - 200	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0165-1765	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/116930
dc.description.abstract	© 2017 Elsevier B.V. This note shows that the first-price auction fully implements efficient investments when agents make not only ex ante but also ex post investments. The essential assumptions of our model are that (i) each agent can invest before and after participating in the auction under the same cost function and (ii) the cost functions are common knowledge among agents. In any equilibrium of our model, the most efficient agent always wins and makes the efficient level of investment.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Economics Letters	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.013	en_US
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject.classification	Economics	en_US
dc.title	First-price auction implements efficient investments	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	159	en_US
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory	en_US
utslib.for	14 Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	159	en_US

Abstract:

© 2017 Elsevier B.V. This note shows that the first-price auction fully implements efficient investments when agents make not only ex ante but also ex post investments. The essential assumptions of our model are that (i) each agent can invest before and after participating in the auction under the same cost function and (ii) the cost functions are common knowledge among agents. In any equilibrium of our model, the most efficient agent always wins and makes the efficient level of investment.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/116930