Matching with aggregate externalities

Fisher, JCD; Hafalir, IE

Matching with aggregate externalities

Fisher, JCD Hafalir, IE

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016, 81 pp. 1 - 7
Issue Date:: 2016-05-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Fisher, JCD	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Hafalir, IE https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6731-2848	en_US
dc.date.available	2020-05-25T19:27:02Z
dc.date.issued	2016-05-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016, 81 pp. 1 - 7	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0165-4896	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/122731
dc.description.abstract	© 2016. Certain aggregate externalities, like those due to knowledge and public goods, do not change very much in response to changes in two individuals' actions. Thus, individuals rationally regard the level of the externality as fixed in their negotiations with each other. We leverage this observation to develop a general framework for the existence of stable matchings in moderately sized one-to-one matching games, and we characterize intuitive restrictions on preferences that are sufficient for existence.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Mathematical Social Sciences	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.03.001	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory	en_US
dc.title	Matching with aggregate externalities	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	81	en_US
utslib.for	16 Studies in Human Society	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
utslib.for	01 Mathematical Sciences	en_US
utslib.for	14 Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	81	en_US

Abstract:

© 2016. Certain aggregate externalities, like those due to knowledge and public goods, do not change very much in response to changes in two individuals' actions. Thus, individuals rationally regard the level of the externality as fixed in their negotiations with each other. We leverage this observation to develop a general framework for the existence of stable matchings in moderately sized one-to-one matching games, and we characterize intuitive restrictions on preferences that are sufficient for existence.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/122731