Does Success Breed Success? a Quasi-Experiment on Strategic Momentum in Dynamic Contests

Gauriot, R; Page, L

Does Success Breed Success? a Quasi-Experiment on Strategic Momentum in Dynamic Contests

Gauriot, R Page, L

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Economic Journal, 2019, 129 (624), pp. 3107 - 3136
Issue Date:: 2019-11-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Gauriot, R	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Page, L https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6020-9733	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2020-04-23T23:33:52Z
dc.date.available	2020-04-23T23:33:52Z
dc.date.issued	2019-11-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Economic Journal, 2019, 129 (624), pp. 3107 - 3136	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0013-0133	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/140236
dc.description.abstract	© 2019 Royal Economic Society. Published by Oxford University Press. We study how agents adapt their behaviour to variations of incentives in dynamic contests. We investigate a real dynamic contest with large stakes: professional tennis matches. Situations in which balls bounce very close to the court's lines are used as the setting of a quasi-experiment providing random variations in winning probability. We find evidence of a momentum effect for men whereby winning a point has a positive causal impact on the probability to win the next one. This behaviour is compatible with a reaction to the asymmetry of incentives between leaders and followers. We do not find momentum for women.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Economic Journal	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1093/ej/uez040	en_US
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject.classification	Economics	en_US
dc.title	Does Success Breed Success? a Quasi-Experiment on Strategic Momentum in Dynamic Contests	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	624	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	129	en_US
utslib.for	14 Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
pubs.issue	624	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	129	en_US

Abstract:

© 2019 Royal Economic Society. Published by Oxford University Press. We study how agents adapt their behaviour to variations of incentives in dynamic contests. We investigate a real dynamic contest with large stakes: professional tennis matches. Situations in which balls bounce very close to the court's lines are used as the setting of a quasi-experiment providing random variations in winning probability. We find evidence of a momentum effect for men whereby winning a point has a positive causal impact on the probability to win the next one. This behaviour is compatible with a reaction to the asymmetry of incentives between leaders and followers. We do not find momentum for women.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/140236