The moral residue of conservation.

Batavia, C; Nelson, MP; Wallach, AD

The moral residue of conservation.

Batavia, C Nelson, MP Wallach, AD

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Publisher:: Wiley
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Conservation biology : the journal of the Society for Conservation Biology, 2020, 34, (5), pp. 1114-1121
Issue Date:: 2020-10

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Batavia, C
dc.contributor.author	Nelson, MP
dc.contributor.author	Wallach, AD
dc.date.accessioned	2020-10-20T05:32:32Z
dc.date.available	2020-01-11
dc.date.available	2020-10-20T05:32:32Z
dc.date.issued	2020-10
dc.identifier.citation	Conservation biology : the journal of the Society for Conservation Biology, 2020, 34, (5), pp. 1114-1121
dc.identifier.issn	0888-8892
dc.identifier.issn	1523-1739
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/143405
dc.description.abstract	Should conservationists use lethal management to control introduced wildlife populations? Should they kill individual animals to protect endangered species? Are trade-offs that prioritize some values at the expense of others morally appropriate? These sorts of ethical questions are common in conservation. In debating such questions, conservationists often seem to presume 1 of 2 possible answers: the act in question is right or it is wrong. But morality in conservation is considerably more complex than this simple binary suggests. A robust conservation ethic requires a vocabulary that gives voice to the uncertainty and unease that arise when what seems to be the best available course of action also seems to involve a measure of wrongdoing. The philosophical literature on moral residue and moral dilemmas supplies this vocabulary. Moral dilemmas arise when one must neglect certain moral requirements to fulfill others. Under such circumstances, even the best possible decision leaves a moral residue, which is experienced emotionally as some form of grief. Examples of conservation scenarios that leave a moral residue include management of introduced rabbits in Australia, trophy hunting in Africa, and forest management trade-offs in the Pacific Northwest. Moral residue is integral to the moral experience of conservationists today, and grief is an appropriate response to many decisions conservationists must make. Article impact statement: Defensible conservation decisions may neglect moral requirements, leaving a moral residue; conservationists should respond with grief.
dc.format	Print-Electronic
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher	Wiley
dc.relation.ispartof	Conservation biology : the journal of the Society for Conservation Biology
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1111/cobi.13463
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.subject	05 Environmental Sciences, 06 Biological Sciences, 07 Agricultural and Veterinary Sciences
dc.subject.classification	Ecology
dc.title	The moral residue of conservation.
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	34
utslib.location.activity	United States
utslib.for	05 Environmental Sciences
utslib.for	06 Biological Sciences
utslib.for	07 Agricultural and Veterinary Sciences
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Science
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Science/School of Life Sciences
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
pubs.consider-herdc	false
dc.date.updated	2020-10-20T05:32:20Z
pubs.issue	5
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	34
utslib.citation.issue	5

Abstract:

Should conservationists use lethal management to control introduced wildlife populations? Should they kill individual animals to protect endangered species? Are trade-offs that prioritize some values at the expense of others morally appropriate? These sorts of ethical questions are common in conservation. In debating such questions, conservationists often seem to presume 1 of 2 possible answers: the act in question is right or it is wrong. But morality in conservation is considerably more complex than this simple binary suggests. A robust conservation ethic requires a vocabulary that gives voice to the uncertainty and unease that arise when what seems to be the best available course of action also seems to involve a measure of wrongdoing. The philosophical literature on moral residue and moral dilemmas supplies this vocabulary. Moral dilemmas arise when one must neglect certain moral requirements to fulfill others. Under such circumstances, even the best possible decision leaves a moral residue, which is experienced emotionally as some form of grief. Examples of conservation scenarios that leave a moral residue include management of introduced rabbits in Australia, trophy hunting in Africa, and forest management trade-offs in the Pacific Northwest. Moral residue is integral to the moral experience of conservationists today, and grief is an appropriate response to many decisions conservationists must make. Article impact statement: Defensible conservation decisions may neglect moral requirements, leaving a moral residue; conservationists should respond with grief.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/143405