Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem

Hirata, D; Kasuya, Y; Tomoeda, K

Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem

Hirata, D Kasuya, Y Tomoeda, K

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Publisher:: Elsevier BV
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, 130, pp. 474-498
Issue Date:: 2021-11-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Hirata, D
dc.contributor.author	Kasuya, Y
dc.contributor.author	Tomoeda, K https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6236-7439
dc.date.accessioned	2021-12-23T00:55:36Z
dc.date.available	2021-12-23T00:55:36Z
dc.date.issued	2021-11-01
dc.identifier.citation	Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, 130, pp. 474-498
dc.identifier.issn	0899-8256
dc.identifier.issn	1090-2473
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/152481
dc.description.abstract	We propose a new solution concept in the roommate problem, based on the “robustness” of deviations (i.e., blocking coalitions). We call a deviation from a matching robust up to depth k, if none of the deviators gets worse off than at the original matching after any sequence of at most k subsequent deviations. We say that a matching is stable against robust deviations (for short, SaRD) up to depth k, if no deviation from it is robust up to depth k. As a smaller k imposes a stronger requirement for a matching to be SaRD, we investigate the existence of a matching that is SaRD with a minimal depth k. We constructively demonstrate that a SaRD matching always exists for k=3 and establish sufficient conditions for k=1 and 2.
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Elsevier BV
dc.relation.ispartof	Games and Economic Behavior
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.012
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
dc.subject	1401 Economic Theory, 1402 Applied Economics
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory
dc.title	Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	130
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
utslib.copyright.embargo	2023-11-30T00:00:00+1000Z
dc.date.updated	2021-12-23T00:55:35Z
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	130

Abstract:

We propose a new solution concept in the roommate problem, based on the “robustness” of deviations (i.e., blocking coalitions). We call a deviation from a matching robust up to depth k, if none of the deviators gets worse off than at the original matching after any sequence of at most k subsequent deviations. We say that a matching is stable against robust deviations (for short, SaRD) up to depth k, if no deviation from it is robust up to depth k. As a smaller k imposes a stronger requirement for a matching to be SaRD, we investigate the existence of a matching that is SaRD with a minimal depth k. We constructively demonstrate that a SaRD matching always exists for k=3 and establish sufficient conditions for k=1 and 2.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/152481